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Directly after the World War, and more par-
ticularly In the past decade, there has been an unusu-
ally ascending tendency In these United States towards
complexity of organization and unparalleled size. So
headlong has this rush been towards that goal thst the
viewpoint of tvi© average business man has been distorted
out of normal focus.
It seems that to the American executive , size
means proportional succesajthe larger the business ,then
the more lucrative will be that business.The Law of Dim-
inishing Returns, J"f known of at all, has been very seldom
consideration
taken into chaos and complete bankruptcy ending
En court receivership has been the inevitable result.
Just how far centralization of powercan be carried so as
to eliminate the wastes , frictions , and inefficiencies of
small competing units without producing the greater
wastes, frictions , and inefficiencies of bureaucratic con-
trol should be thentest eonlled to all mergers and pro-
*2
posed consolidations.
Here in New England the operation of this Law
hs« been brought home to us with an unforgettable force
by the many mergers in the small cotton mill business.
It is not my purpose to attempt to recite the histcry
of those mergers , other than to say that in all cases
( 1 ) . A .S .Dewing— Corporation Finance— ch .19— p. 221
.
(2) .^orld 1 s Work—October ,1930—p. 25 .
t
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dl/ter was the inevitable end to /majority of them.
The desire for bigness on the part of these New Eng-
land operators failed to recognize that a point where
the ratio or bslance between man andTachine has been
reached , and a drop In profits after this point has
been passed,would apply in the present and future
as It had in the past. Fortunately the executives
of these corporations are now on ?aner ground ,an^
fully realize that the future success of the cotton
business in New England does not exist in complex
orgenl zations »but rather in intensive development
of the small plan 4 .
Application to Rgilroads .
Although the law applies to all types of bus-
iness - yet the point where the law operates is far
beyond thereach© of some branches of industry and
we might even be led to the belief that it cannot
operate in the consolidation and mergers of the
modern railroads companies. But the law Is lnex-
orable f and wil eventually besrin to operate in no
matter what the enterpri se ,1 f the complexity goes
a
to a point where the unwieldiness of mar/cement out-
weighs the benefits to be gained.
But the railroad industry is one which is
peculiar to the field of business demanding no set
£ r'l) 89T 9rf ) ibn C "7 3 ~5
ruler of oro-gni 7s 1 1 on bp compared to other?, hut taMncr
Its pattern from experience. Defeated In one oh^se^lt
rlFep to newer heichtp when the orpopltlon Is so^lled-
8nd sroee to pt^rt a new chapter in organization.
I nevl tableness of Consoll d
e
tlOB .
Consolida tlon will go on throughout the modern
era: some will disrupt that "branch of industry in
vhich it is attempted, if not sruided in the Droper
channels. For we cannot eliminate from bupiness the
greedy grafters who hover atout all enterpriser to
subject them to their wiles and place the public good
behind them. For that reason it is well that our gov-
ernments
,
both national an? local, thoroughly in-
vestigate any proposed consolidations and bring them
into the light especially when + hey affect the public
service. In the field of the r^ll^oad such i nvest 1 a? 1 1 ons
have been in operation Pince the latter part of the
nineteenth century. Today + he railro^^- are before
the oublic in the full glare of publicity for con-
solidations proposed by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission have found opposition in all parts of the
country and public bearinp-p at tbe national capital
have been
. in progress since February ,10, and will
continue untlllall opposition has been-re^vei -heard
.
Since New England will be vitally affected by nO
(3).The United States Daily—February 10,1^32-p.l.
3l sm
en.?.
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matter what plan In adopted it will be of definite
value to a proper appreciation of these plans as they
apply to thir sectionto first make, a study of con-
solidation? and their history In New England.
Meaning of Consolidation.
To bescln with a full recognition of the meaning
i
of consolidation and the methods used to s^ain this
end Mil make the situation clearer. Consolidation,
4
specifically speaking, means t^e disappearance of
preexisting corporations Into the new corporation,
" the complete mercrer and transfer of the property
of the corporations consollde tin.* , the title thereto
vesting in the company which stands out as the pro-
duct of the proposed consolidation."
This means that the new consolidated system shall be
sole owner, sole manager and sole operator of the
system in question. However, this complete consolidation
Is not always present in the business world of to-day,
strictly speaking, and so we must consider other methods
by which the ends of consolidation are attained,
eventho the old corporation is not completely eliminated;
but for varying purposes the corporation exercises
definite control -nd directs the policjee^ of the
companies so co-ordinated .For the purposes of this
paper we shall consider consolidation in Its BOre
4 Wiuthrop Daniel, in Th^ Harvard Business Review,
October, 1931— p. io.
n9f nof^
to-oo 08 e9fn
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practical sense ,»nd It will be sufficient to Bay that
It is a direct merger of the financial siri operating
control within the new comoration of the corporation
po merlins?.
Methods of Consol id ation .
Consolidation methods, accordlnsr to A .B.Dewinsr,
run from mere traffic agreements, which are really
not consolidations at all, to ahsolute ownership.
A
list of such a sprier is as follows:
1. Traffic a oree
n
+ s, th inte^^hpnce of traffic
"beinf optional'.
2. Pools, with the crn+ral bureau v,!, v 1 npr 9utoc r »t1c
direct! n of routines.
3. Traffic ap-reeme nt s, <"i th provision for exclusive
traffic interchange when possible
.
A . Le a s e .
5. Control hy the ownership of a majority or working
minority of the Stock.
m
6. Lease and partial or en f ire stock o^ner^hir.
7. Ownership of entire capital, hut the subsidiary
road operates under separate franchl seri erht s, and main-
tains a separate corporate exi stence-ani ~o r sibly a
separate name
.
3, Absolute ownership, either through the o-jfcrifht
acnu^sition of the real estate and r>erson»l rrorerty, or
(5 )—A.S .Dewing The Financial Policy of Corporation
p. 621
St
. f
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else through th* complete extinction of the separate
existence of one or more corporations.
Fools and Traffic Agre ements
Since traffic agreements and pools do not
involve control, it will not bp of any advantage to con-
sider such alliances under the general heading of con-
solid? tions .They have been listed here, merely to show
their presence in modem railroad policy, and yet one
might select them as definite steps towards consolidation.
These several phases must be kept in mind
as distinct from "community of interest" .Sincg control
is defined as "the ability tc determine the action of
a corporation" twe must exclude from full discussion
both "community of interest" , and pools.
To be termed a "consoli da tion" ,any degree of
relationship among rail^c-ds must involve an absolutely
unified control of technical and financial affairs of
the consolidated road. In other rrords the roads oust be"
operated as onejthe control of the finacial operations
must be thoroughly and completely unified .Therefore , we
find it necessary to consider only the latter four of
Professor Dewing' s groupings as definite forms of ctn-
solidations .For a better understanding of each, it is
well to give a label of identif lcation, bei ore proceed* ag.
1
.Lea se
A lease of one railroad by another In terms of a
consolidation may run from a loose , temporary connec-
*7
tlon to a virtual merger .Suoerfi cla lly , each corporation
Is free to act respecting the direction of Its road as
well ae to the dividends, If any
t
and usually means that
the lessee holds part or all of the stoc^ ; although
this Is not always the case„An Illustration of the
latter alternative is the relationship between the
Boston and Albany Railroad Company and the New Yor>
Central Company; the latter does not hold any of the
stoc 1' of the former.
The length of a lease may run from a short period
of time to even the lifetime of each corporate on.The
commonly stated period of time is ninety-nine years,
but it is not uncommon to have a lease read for nine
hundred and ninety-nine years. This long term may be
said to be characteristic of the Maine Central leases
of its numerous subsidiaries,
Compensa tion for the leased property is made in
one of two waye_; either(a)f ixed rental or(b)contin-
gent earnings ,ba sed on volnoe of traffic Interchanged;
the latter is the more common in the railroad organ-
ization of to-day.
Fixed rentals compensation merely means the payment
(7) ~A.S.Dewirring Corporation Finance, ch. 20, r. 249
(8) -A.S2DEWING Corporation Finance ,ch. 20, p. 2^0
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mof a definite eum on the psrt of the leafed road to the
lease. At the time of msking the lease arontract between
the Boston and Albany and 1bhe New York Central, two mil-
lion dollars a year was the fixed rents 1 determined uron
But as often hspoens under virtusl control,
"eve loo
fixed rental may often -devo-lv-e into a mere bookkeeping
arrangement by the acquisition of the bonds and stocks
of the subsidiary on the part of the parent corporation.
This arrangement , however , is often used to shield a stra-
tegic manouver,in both recessions lperiods as veil as In
periods of marked prosperity.
In a period of declining income* the parent coj
pany might use the scheme of fixed rental? to further it
ovn ends by msniruls tlon of accounts;snd in -erlods of
prosperity , the scheme might be used to shut off security,
holders from participation in the earning* of the eompan,
Contingent Earnings
The contingent earnings rents l,which is the
commonly
moro/cf the tvo,hss its chief advantage over the fixed
rerifeitl in that the rents 1 is bseed on gross earnings of
the read under leas^.In periods of depression, the lessed
roa" Bay withhold rental payments from Its surplus, thus
building its strength.Dup to the manipulation of earn-
ings , however
,
the true results of this method pre unknown
-c ecarfDS 9rfJ" 9^jj Jr'gfm v:n^cr
25,
Because of its recurrent use in the financial and
technical operations of the railroads throughout the
country this method of consolidation must have its ad-
vantages. There are perhaps two which may explain its
general popularity .The first of these is that a lease
allows the benefits of united operation without the
teeavy financial cost of other methods of consolidation
to "be reviewed later .There Is definite appeal tothe
stock-holder? as wellas to the directors of a railroad
to acquire control over a second railroad without the
heavy expense Involved In one of these other methods
of acquisition,A second advantage may be called the
elasticity o f the arrangement : for this is a more flex-
ible arrangement than stock control. If the railroads
are not successful in their general operations how-
develop
ever .this method may d-e-vo-iv-e Into a disadvantage. It
virtually means that a readjustment on the part of
the corporation can take place at the end of the period
to meet the new demands of the next century.
There are definite disadvantages to a lease arrange-
ment and the chief one to be cited Is based on the un-
certainty of the bond of union .At any time interested
parties may break up the lease through bankruptcy pro-
in
ceedings ending/ a receivership to the advantage of the
lessee„Then again ,there are the numerous detail? to
be arranged before the lease becomes operative in order
(9)-A.S.Dewing Corporation Finance ,ch.20,p.251
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to escape a dispute .The foi/dat 4 on of such a dispute,
ai a rule,r ill on the right to Issue new securities,
and the proper division of Hprovsrrent expenditures be-
tween capital account and income account in the field of
•10
accounting
.
The second method of consolidation is that
of securing, control hy the ownership of a majority or a
working minority of the stock of the road tc b« lea?e5.
This stock may be purchased in one of two w*ys:(*)by
outright purchase of the stock &t a cash outlay on the
open market; or, (b)^in this control by exchanging the
stock of the subsidiary corporation for thet of the- pur-
11
chasing corpora t ion .Under this method we will also con-
sider the use of the collateral trust "bond to acquire
the nejessary amount of stock,
Due to the large amount of sapltal involved
in the cash purchase of stock in the ooen market, that
method is not as prevalent today as it cnce fraa.ucw'n to
the panic »f 1393 this meth©d was quite common In railroad
policy, anc. is chiefly responsible for tne present vast
holdings ot the New York Jentral corporation. Since cor-
poratlone nave become so large in the past decade, this
method may once a&ain become a prime rule of consolidation
in the railroad field .The setting aside of' part of the
urplui in a reserve fund is becoming a characteristic
feature of the policy 3f the larger railroads,,
r0 B
. ft C i
t
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By acquiring control through living a certain
number of shares of the parent corporation for those of
th"? subsidiary has an attraction in that no money or
cash lr Involved in the merger directly . Inorder to
consummate such a merger there must be sufficient attrac-
tiveness In t he stock of the parent corpora tion, however
,
to induce the stockholder of the leased road to give
up his stock in this new transaction.
The Collateral Trust Bond
A prominent method to gain such stock is by
use of the collateral trust bond,which substitutes
credit for money. This methcu was characteristic of the
period succeeding the panic of 1393.This lessee is en-
abled to attain the necessary amount of ttock without
a cash outlay in one of two way s : el ther( a ) ,bv outright
purchase of the entire stock using its own "bonds as
collateral for the stock to purchased ; or , (b ),by pur-
chc-*e of the majority oi ohe stock using the bonds as
the mediuci.
To the bondholder this method has three definite
advantages :( l) , the bonds represent a single security;
(2), double security ir gained by the general credit ol
the issuing corpora tion; ( 3 ) »on dissolution of the merger
the sale of stock will bring a return. The chief disad-
vantages lie In the relatively low position of the bond-
(10) .A. S.Dewing,—Corporation Finance ch. 20, p. 250
( 11) .A.S .Devlng,—The Financial Policy of Corporations--
B 00k 4,ch„4,p.732
£ r - r
r
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holder In the succespive issues of the railroad cor-
poration.
The third method under consideration Is that of
ownership of the entire capital of the subsidiary but
the subsidiary road operates under seperate franchise
rights, and maintains a seoerete corporate existence,
sometimes a seperate name.*The reason for such a
procedure u«u*llv lies in the *>ee<3 to -»8*nt?ln* ^<et*net
rela tionshl o, ^ue to state requirements or to retain
a favorable attitude on the part of political au-
thorities .The management of the acquire^ road may be in
a distant city, and so represents a policy foreign to
the principles of the native locality .Such a method
would no doubt have to be followed in acquiring the
railroads of Maine .The Maine roads are in a position
not common in many sections of the nationin that they
are practically free from local taxation.To maintain
such a favorable attitude would require local control.
The final method of consolidation and one which
t
Is not so common to-dey
f
is that of absolute owner-
ship and complete disappearance of subsidiary corpor-
ations .This is done either by outright acauisltlon of
the real estate and personal property of the road to be
acquired, and yet maintaining a seosrate name, or the com-
plete extinction of the seoerate existence of that cor-
*ll
poratlon f and its complete submergence in the new company.
The use of this final method been limited in this
( 12) .A. S.Dewing,—The Fimancial Policy of Corporations
—
Book 4 f ch.4,p.709
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century to the acquirement of email railroads by
large corporations for strategic pumoses .The trans-
fer of the liabilities of the speller reed through a
bond issue may be the general method used in such
trans8ctions.lt Is this absolute ownership which the
Interstate Commerce Comml ssionwi shes to see completed
throughout the entire country .This absolute ownership
the railroad companies have found so easy to evade
In gaining control of a desired road through a less
costly method.
History of Consolidations
Consolidations have been a mark of railroad or-
ganization down through the decade? ; sotnt tbrougl 118-
honest methods , seme tV? M|gh the laudatory ambitions of
single indivi due Is eager for personal aggranflisement
.
Starting in 1550 these consolidations have encountered
opposition both from an aroused public and diverse
interests E-jch as the canal opposition of the middle
•14
x£0 % s .Through that long vlata of growth in the latter
part of the nineteenth century and the setbacks of
the early twentieth century, down to the World War
when the government stenped In ,and took over control
of the vest net-work of railroads throughout the coun-
try, men of driving force and ambition have had that
one goal of unification.the object of adverse leg-
islation from the start, yet these institutions have
( 13) oA.S.Dewing,—Corporation Finance— ch<,20,p.256
(14) .Cleveland and Powell—Railroad Finance--ch. 15
,
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thrived in the struggle , and finally have witnessed
the government S|v#itl etsmr of approval to contem-
plated consolidations .To better understand the bafllfi
of present consolidations It is veil to review the past
history of rai lroads f and construct thif foundation
of history "before turning our full attention to the
future
.
Origin of railroads
The Baltimore and Ohio railroad in 1329 first
combined the old railroad which war initiated in
Massachusetts in 1" 25,with steam-power initiated in
England .Starting In 1330 the growth of these e.all
lines was a msTl -if the next decade or two .Without
any definite plan of growth in New England ,the 1 r num-
bers grew to such an extent that ,&cr?ec to tie varying
p. ages, a need for romp change wee evident. The purpose
of ell road? of this period was to make possible trans-
portetion j^ijii +Ti Ifr between cities and tow.;'- here in
New England without respect to the needs of a third
locality o
Beginning in 1350 these short roads ,which were
really end-to-end roads ,were undergoing a transfor-
mation m that they were Deln^ Drought under single
16"
operating rximnu^ax management .Beginning in this period,
the primary purpose became to make t^ese roads into
a continuous trans portetion service between cities
and towns of New England .Opposition wa? noted to these
(l5).Slason Thompson—A Short History Of Railroads
—
ch„4,p 0 46
*(1 10
ertJ «
.
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consolidations .necessary as "they were.even in that early
period,tut this work went on.Befcrs 1373 some unity to
these innumerable wandering roads was brought about,
as well as adopting a standard guage .Imuetus w*s then
given to suceedlng transportation development.
For the next two de cade t, to 1390 ; promotion of
railway systems was the dominant policy .The improved roll-
ing stock of the railroads had added to their pooular
usage , resulting in a demand for improved service which
the railroad officials cold not deny .Competition between
the various1 carriers, as well as the psychological force
Impelling the business executives of the day to expand,
brought about extensive organization and development of
railway systems.
This desire of railroad officials to personally
control the situation was the greatest force in existence
to bring about consollda.tion.The particular plan of system
was the extension both longitudinally and latltudinally
16
of single short trunk lines. In 1393 the size of there
systems had increased t« such an extent that there were
more than thirty fc^ews^fi^ railroads over one thousand
miles in length f and five systems over five thousand miles.
(15) .A.S .Dewing—Corporation Finance—ch.2J,n.2S2
( 16) .A.S .Dewing—Corporation Finance—ch.20,p.26l
( 17) .W.Z.Ripley--Railroad Finance—ch. 14, p.471.
1. . .(
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1390 to 1910-Perlod of Corruption
From 1893 to 1910 the combining of these
marked
systemsunder single financial powers -be-G-a-me 9 period
of ruthless and headstrong competltion.lt now became
a race between powerful Interests to retain each for
itself the complete domination of vast railroad mile-
age, and resulted In both state and national corruption.
The historic clash between Harriman and Hill
p
as well
as the scandalous results of other western railroad
movements were an echo to the dubious strategy of
the eastern interests. In a short resume of the In-
dividual railroads of New England we will note Its
baneful influence upon the future of New England
consolidation.
This a^m to increase the financial and
administrative control of whole sections of territory
by a few could not help but result In eventual disaster.
Not only the capitalists af the day but also the country
itself were not ready for such a headlong and blind
series of consolidations. The systems early became too
unwieldy, and throughout the contry reactionary legisla-
tion set in, and by the famous Northern Securities case
of 1902 in the Roosevelt administration, the death-knell
was sounded to the bankrupt railroads^ and their overlords
who, more for personal gain than public servi ce
f
pis ced
saipe railroad consolidation in an unhealthy condition,
(lo) .W.Z.Ripley—Railroad Finance— ch.l4,p.472.
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T'odern Period
From 1910 down throuerh the World War the con-
solidation qf railroads hod not crone apace for the public
was not soon to forget the scpndale bt the preceding decade.
The Meed for some new alignment wos noted In 1915 *'hen It
"became apparent to Congress that the railroad transportation
ey stem $ne not taeetiug the requirement! of the country. The
Institution of the Newlands committee was designed to over-
come the current evils, but the entry of America Into the
War thrust the findings of this committee into the "background.
By the proclamation of Woodrow Wilson in the first
ye^r of our participation, which ©mbined the entire network
of the country under one director, consolidction received its
first legislative aid. Th^ roads of the country had v?en
unsble to give orooer service in x,n±s great crisis, and un-
impeded treit'ic couia ce gained only by forgetting -he
divisions of the railroads ?nd treating Lhen as a unit.
-eruaii.1 ecoiiumietj audj etivice uenAi'ics were tne
outsoc uaxng ma i- as of ohis go v element, regulation, and trie
iact mat t,ne railroads could be advantageous ly unified lent
enc our^genent to the unselfish exr»onenfe« of railroad consol-
Ida t ion in the country. The roads were returned tc their
^"isinal owners finally but the country and government ^ere
awakened to the new possibilities, in railroad policy.
( 19) •W.M7/.Splawn--Cc.ifol Idatlon of Railroadsch.2 ,p . 19
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In 1920 a definite step towards legal unifi-
cation of the country' 8 railroad ay stem wsfl under-
pa s ?^ge
taken by the government with the publl-G-a-trlon of the
'
*20
Transportation Act, In the Senate of the United Stnt
this bill had been under the name of the Cummins bill
and included the granting of power to the I.C.C. to
enforce consolitption. In the House a bill with
other railroad recommenflat ions than consolidation
wa3 underway with the name of Eech attached. The two
were combined - except that the "enforcing" clause
was omitted, and received the President's signature
under the name of the Transportation Act of 1920.
Transportation Act has Weakeneeses
This Act gave new impetus to a realignment of systems
in the country, but the fact that the Commission had
no power to enforce its recommendations was the weak
•21
point. A second major weak point was that the roads
were allowed to acquire those subsidiaries which con-
formed to the general plane* by 8ny means other than
by direct consolidation, or "disappearance into the
one corporation of the preexisting corporation or cor
pcrations". And the corporations of the country pro-
ceeded to t^ke advantage of this more economical and
simpler method without fear of reprisal by legal in-
voking of the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
(20) .Johnson and Yaa Metre—Principles o* Railroad
Transportation— ch,29 ,p.5l4
( 21) 0Wlnthrop Daniels in Harvard Business, Oct
.1931
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Requisitions o f the Ac t
The m8^or requisitons of the Transports tlon
Act as theyaffect consolidation may he listed as
*22
follows :
-
(1) The I.C.C. should adopt a plan for con-
solidation of the nation^ railroads Into a limited
number of systems.
(2) In this plan competition among systems
should "be preserved as far as possible and existing
channels of trade should be maintained wherever
practicable
.
(3) The systems should be so arranged with re-
gard to costs of transportation and Values of their
properties that uniform service rates would produce
substantially the same rates of earnings on the sev-
eral systems.
(4) When such a plan had been tentatively
announced, hearings should be held and a final plan
adopted subject to future modifications,
(5) Regardless of all anti-trust laws, railway
consolidation should be permitted if Judged by the
Commission to be in harmony with the plan.
(6) The total par value of the securities of
the new corporation should not exceed the par value
of the securities of the various individual properties
to be merged Into the Consolidated system. The values
are to be ascertained unfiter the Valuation Act.
(22). The BT«w Republic—
.Apr 11 15 ,1925—pp.801-2
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Tentative Plan Announced
Pursuant to the first article, the Commission
sooolnted Professor Ripley Harvard , one of
the foremost authorities In Economics In th« country,
to tna <e a * horou^hi- sturdy of the railroad of the
nation '.^ th a view towards consolidating ill rail-
roads -.mder a limited number of ayatana, "nd to report
hi a rec immcndations fo the Commission.
After a thorough and sincere effort to make
such s stjidy , Professor Ripley returned his recommen-
dations to the Commission, and there, v Ith a few excep-
tions, were embodied In the port of the Commission
sug^ertttgn nineteen systems for the railroad l of
this country. It j s of interest to us to rec what dls-
*23
position W88 to be made of the railroads of New England.
System .fl
New York Central Railroad
Boston and Ifaine
Bangor and Aroostook
The Maine Central
"Delaware and Hudson
Rutland Hailroad
Ogdenaburcr and Lake Chamrlain
Boston and Albanv
(23).W.M.W.Splawn—Consolidation of Railroads—
ch. 2, p. 30-42
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System #2
Baltimore and Ohio
N.Y., Ontario and Western
Lefeigh and Hudson River
Lehich and New England
The New Haven
System #7 - All New England - Alternative
The New Haven
Boteton and Maine
Maine Central
Bangor and Aroostook
Delaware and Hudson
Such were the proposed consolidations of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1923, "but before entering into
a discussion of the merits of these systems a clearer
picture of the situation might be gained by examining
the make-up of the major railroads of New England, their
relations w ithput- side lines, the traffic Interchange,
and the terrltoyyserved
.
The principal railways of New England are:
the New York, NevO Haven and Hartford; the Boston and
Maine; the Central Vermont; the Bangor and Aroostook;
the Maine Central; the Boston and Albany. The total
mileage/^ of the New England roads is 8300 miles or
three percent of the country's total which on the face
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of It seems extremely negligible . In the proportion
to the area served .however, New England la far beyond
the nation's average.
There sre trenty-seven miles of railway per
one hundre' square Miles In -'assachusetts^an compared
with an aver-sure of one hundred snuare mile? containing
in the country,
eight and one-half ra'les of railway /Of these New england
railwaye f the greatest ,both In point of mileage and service
Is the New I-7a-/en.
fron a glance at the accomoaivi ma.o It <m be
seen that the New Raven serves practically the entire
southern area of New England , which Is divided into two
part?? ty the Boston and Albany 7Atldt frorr the intrusion
of the Central Veroont railway into the state of Connec-
ticut. t the New Haven alone strves the stst.es of Rhode Island
and Connecticut.
I he gag Haven Railroa d
The prerent Sew Haven ra4J.road is a result of
the Consolidation of t~o hundred and tbree railroads, a
tact not to be disregarded in the signification of this
{law England problem. On August 6, 1872 the New Haven
v-ae incorporated in Connecticut and Ka n'schn setts ; in
1893 an Rhode Islanders 9 consolidation of the New York,
and New Haven Railroad Cosp^ny which was chartered in
Connecticut in MaJ, 1844 with the Hartford and New Haven
Railroad Company which had been chartered in Connecticut
in l!ay, 1833.
( 25 ) .Wm.Haney—The Business of Railway Transportation
—
Part 2,ch.6",p.lOO.
tf.
*
s\
N<>uJ

22
By the '90' e the New Haven had Dlcked up most
of Its competitors in the southern sections. The Old
Colony Railroad ,as well as the Fall River Boat line,
were taken over by the New Haven in foreclosure sale
from the New York Central.
In 1901 the New Haven purchased the New York, Ontario
and Western Railroad company so giving her access to
the Pennsylvania hard coal fields. In this ye»r p alno f
the company "brought under control all the electric trolley
lines throughout Connecticut and Rhode Island. The Cen-
tral New England road, an independent line to the 3-reat
Lakes, was also a product of this era.
By exchange of stock in 1907, the Boston and
stock control
Maine' was purchased , followed "by a co-operative agree-
ment in 1911 with the New £ork Central to share in the
profits and losses of the Boston and Albany .But the
legislatures of the several states became alarmed at
such wholesale combinations , and Immediately forced the
Morgan-Mellen combine to cease operations in this terri-
tory. The dissolution of the system began and ended with
the Boston and Maine stock placed in the hands of trustees.
These Boston and Maine holdings were returned
to the New Haven in 1923 and now form an integral part
of its present security-holdings .The total lines now owned
and operated by the Hew Haven are two thousand ,and one
hundred and twenty-two miles,but this corporation also
has substantial interests in other transport agencies
as thw prosperous Connecticut company , previously noted.
tacr 7jy &©5l3f<7 bBrf n^v?H wgH ssif 3 00 9/iJ^ci
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The- New. England Steamship Company ,and the Hew England
Transportation Coroany , operating "bus and truck trans-
portation ixeets are two of its better-known subsld-
iarier
.
The Boston Railroad Ho lding Company
The Boston Railroad Holding company was in-
corporated under Massachusetts laws on June 19,1901,
with the"sole purpose of acquiring all or any part of
the capital stock,bonds or other evidences of indebted-
•26
ness of the Boston and Maine Railroad Company . "Thi
s
corporation is the agency through which the Hew Haven
maintains its extensive holdings in the Boston and Maine.
The amount of Eonton and Maine securities
held by this corporation is approximately thirty per
cent of the entire issue.On October 17 , 1914,under a
decree issued by the Hnited States court for the sou-
thern district of New York, this stock had been transferred
to f J /e trustees, who were appointed by this same court
with orders to sell the stocV , later returned tc the
New Kaven,June 4, 1923. This corporation retairs common
stock of the Boston and Main* to the value of $28, 242,536
,
and preferred stock to the value of $l,C50,r^.
( 26 ) .Cleveland and -Powell—Railroad Finance— ch.l6,p.?17.
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two following
The revenues gained from thesr entero'-i^efl
have aided the New Haven In buildlnc up a surolus
In the past few years which will tide It over the
exigencies of the present period. In 1929 the New
Haven received from the Co_nnfict_lcul_company total
dividends of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000),
and In 1930 the dividends amounted to more than one
million dollars, #1,000, 000)
.
The resumption "by the Boston and Maine In
n
1930, after a seveteen year lapse ,of<3ividends on Its
common stock was cf Inestimable aid to the New Haven.
Add to these the reduction In costs resulting from
the large sums Invested In new facilities and eouio-
raent,as well as skilfull ooeratlnsr management
,
gives
the New Haven a better financial condition than at any
time In the past two decades. The gross revenue for the
New Haven In 1929 was one hundred and forty-two million
dollars, (#142, 000, 000) ,so placing It among the first
fifteen railroads In the country.
The ownership of the New Haven is diversified,
but its present management lies within the confines
of New England. The Pennsylvania Ra ilrord , through ltd
own direct holdings and those of its subsidiary holding
corpora tion, the Pennroad Corporation, possesses slightly
more than twenty-two per cent of the New Haven voting
stock.This substantial Der centege is regarded as a
working control of the New Haven,but as yet, the Penn
-*ITnf> not
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hps not exercised that control. The New Haven If ablp
to crecte those interests it desires ,uni mpeded by the
dictatorship of the "foreign* Penn.
The Boston and Ma i ne
The secomd largest rMlroad in New England
Is the unfortunate Bo°ton and Maine, which wa s Incor-
porate" under the Ipws of Mew York state In 1919 as
a reorganization of the corporation of the same na^e,
formerly incorporated in the stste of Msine.The origi-
nal of the Boston and Maine was opened February 23,
1343 ,ext<: ndirLg from Wilmington to South Berwick ,Ma ine
.
Through numerous leases acquired in suceeding years, this
corporation brousrht thousands of miles of railway unaer
its control.
The mainline of the road runs north from Boston
to Portland , where it meets the J'aine Centra 1 .Sever? 1 "branch
lines radiate from those two citiep through the states
of Maine, New Hampshire ,Mas*ach'jsetts and Vermont, with a
road
leased /continuing to the Province of Quebec.
The Boston and Maine hasbeen the football of
politicians as well «f of grasping corr-ora tlons , since its
ince ption.The weaknesses of its msnaere~ent have been great ,?»nd
•I
(
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even nature has taken a hand In its ml sfortunes .In
1927 a disastrous flood in the state of Vermont placed
a further burden on the corporat ionwith a net lose of
approximately three million dollars ,( *3 ,000,000) a
Successful attempts have been made in the
past few years to bring the road from its unfortunate
position. In conjunction with the Central Vermont and
the Grand Trunk, It Is ooerating a aocomotive in three
runs between Montreal and Boston over their respective
lines. Other policies aretjoint use of the facilities
of the above lines at White River Junction,Vermont
;
*nd a satisfactory arrangement with the New Haven on
the Joint use of their locomotives .This new policy
has resulted in economies far beyond the average.
The position of the Boston and Maine in
relation with the ro8ds of the nation is comparable
with that of the Lackawanna , and considerably ahead of
*27
the Wabash and the Lehigh Valley. In 1929 the gross rev-
venues of the road amounted to seventy-eight million
dollars, ($79, 000, 000), illu3trating its forward progress.
The corporation is strongly under the influ-
ence of outside managementwithits major policies
dictated by the,. New Haven road. The combined holdings
of the New Haven and the Penn road in the corporation
hundredths
amount to forty-four and .line-tenths per cent , (44 . ) .
of the entire stock issue „Such figure? as these warrant
(27).Report of the Joint Committee— May ,1931—o. 26
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the assertion that outside dDmlnance is now working
comparative "benefits In the Boston and Maine finan-
cial status.
The Bo? ton and Albany Railroad
The Boston and Albany road, which If under
lease to the powerful end stable New York Central,
was incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts on
November 2,1370 ,as a consolidation of the Boston
and Albany Railroad; the Albany and West Stockbridge;
the Hudson and Boston Railroad corporation .On Nov-
.ember 15, 1399, the road was leased to the New York
Central for ninety-nine years. The term is to run
from July 1,1900 at a cash rental basis of two million
dollars , ($2,000,000) , per annum
The next Important event of this roads ex-
istence came under the date of 1911,when an arrange-
ment was entered into with. the New Haven, whereby the
latter was to receive traffic rights over stipulated
portions of the Boston and Albany, and a half-ahare
in the results of those ope rati ons .However , on January
31, 1914, at the behest of the government , this agreement was
cancelled by the New Haven, at that time under the rapa-
cious control of the Morgsn-Mellen combine.
The entire mileage of this road amounts to
only three hundred and six miles. The main line runs
(
n—
C
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from Boston due west through the entire breadth of
Ma ssachuaetts ,and on Into the state of New York.
Since its lncluaitlon under the dominion of the
New York Central, the road hap shown a definite up-
ward trend , especially ao durlnc the past decade
,
as it was the moat sound of all New England roads
with the possible exception o" the Eans?or and Aroos-
took. For the past two or three years , however^, thl
a
road has not shown the volume and earnings of t>^e
preceding decade. It still retains substantial earn-
ing power to be ranked well up in the profitable
roads of the East.
The Maine Central Railroad
The Maine Central road,which next engages
our attention,was incorporated on October 23,1862 under
Maine laws, as a consolidation of the Androscoggin and
Kennebec Railroad with the Penobscot and Kennebec
Railroad .Since that date, it has absorbed numerous amall
lines throughout the southern section of the state. In
1374 it absorbed the Portland and Kennebec; the Somerset
and Kennebec ;and the Leeds and Farmington.Ih succeed-
ing years the Maine Shore LineRoad f the Knox and Lin-
coln, the Somerset, and finally the Washington foflnty
ro8d were brought within the ownership of the Maine
u
Central .The total mileage of the road now amonts
to eleven hundred and twenty-nine miles
.
is
eoi en) to 93/39.
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The territory covered by thl* road in its
onerationeare the northern and eastern pactions of
Maine p and on Into New Hampshire .Besides Its rsllroad
holdings the corporation poieeeree the Portland Ter-
minal Company , who? e facilltlea the Boston and Maine
uses for a northern terminal, and several small bo^t
lines
.
The road,which at one time was under the
control of the Boston and Maine ,1s now entirely free
of outside control and dominated by Maine business
men„Eleven hundred and thirty-five of the fifteen
ft olders
hundred and ninety-one common shared as well as four
hundred and forty-five of the five hundred and sixty-
holders
eight of the preferred shared are held by Maine res-
Idents.The capitalization of, the corporation is not
heavy, and throughout Its lifetime the fixed charged
met
have been/each year practically without exception.
A feature$inoted previously ,is the tax-exempt policy
pursued by the Maine government in its relations
with this road.
The Central Vermont Railroad
The Central Vermont Railroad is an interest-
ing road in that 44 its control is not only in a man-
agement outside the state,but also outside the limits
of the United States. The full name of this corporation
is the Central Vermont Railway , Incorporated , and it was
10 f J'JR
t
i
5 tj r.i insflnuvco
so Incorporated In Vermont on July 30, 1999, aa the
successor to the Central Vermont Railway Company
which lsfcd been In receivership since December 12 f
1927.The predecessor tothe present was 4h« Incorporated
In the state on November 18 f 1398 ;whera s the original
corporation was financially weak, the present cor-
poration is now forging to the front.
The company leases the New London Northern
Railroad company 9 snd controls the Vermont Junction
Railway, as well as the Central Vermont Transporta-
tion Company «The total mileage of the company amonnts
to four hundred and sixty-nine miles, of which two
hundred and seventy-one miles is directly owned ,and
one hundred and ninety-eight miles is under lease. The
lines extend from St. Albans fVermont to St .Johns,
Quebec;and from the former city to White River Junc-
tion^and fromthere to New London f Connecticut , where
its subsidiary
,
the Central Vermont Transportation Com-
pany , operates a line of steamers to New York City.
The Canadian National Railway Company con-
trols the Central Vermont through ownership ,but the
road is seperately operated as a distinct unit.Under
the terms of the contract , certain properties ,both f eal
and personal,which are not deemed necessary for railroad
purposes f are conveyed to the Centmont Corporations
'65 br.a feflrt]
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subsidiary .The immediate cause of receivership was
the heavy loss Incurred in the disastrrjs floods of
1927, which rendered the corporation powerless to make
a f inancialcomebsck.Under the paternal management of the
Canadian National, the road has undergone a cc.i.olete
rehabilitation # and la showing definite progress towards
attainment of financial soundness.
The Bango r and Aroostook Railroad
The final road to be considered in this brief
~ survey is the Bangor. and Aroostook,which operates in
the northeastern section of Maine. This corporation was
incorporated under Maine laws on February 13 ,1891. By
the charter Maine men controlled the line,wh«_fch ran
from Brownvllle Junction to Caribou .Branches of the
road since acquired are :the Fort Fairfield and Ashland
Railroad ;the Bangor and Piscataquis in lS99;the Patten
and Sherman and other smaller lines in succeeding years.
The tcL&l mileage now directly operated is six hundred
and t-'enty miles.
All franchise and property richts are vested
In the Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Company .which was
formerly controlled by the Aroostook Construction Com-
pany; the latter having disposed of its holding? in 1924.
Actual control by majority stock holdings r-t3ts in the
h
Lee f Hlgglnson Company ; altough many individuals in the
state of Maine own more shares in total f they indicate thi
t
11 Comnany
Company as the ma.^r party. That coraDany ooese^ep,
at oreaent , eighteen and seventy-elcht hundredths Der
centof the common stock, and twenty-five »nd sixty-six
hundredths per cent of the ^referred stock. The majority
of the hoard of directors are Maine residents , however
.
The corporation is now in an unusually strong
positionwith a free purplus on December 31, 1930, of five
million, one hundred and forty-three thousand dollars,
( $5 , 143 ,000) .In that same year the earnings of the
company were the largest in its h1story,so much so, that
the dividends were three dollars and fifty cents a share,
the par value of which was fifty dollars.
Such are the main railroads of New England.
They are not trunk lines extending across the entire
Eastern area, but are terminal lines defending for their
existence on the initiative of outside lines in assem-
bling carloads of freight ,bringing them to the bound-
aries of New England , there to be disseminated through-
out? the ee- states. In another sense, the five New England
roads initiate business by bringing the New England man-
ufactured goods to the gateways to be transferred to one
of the ma ^or trunk lines, and then on to the various cor-
ners of the nation.
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Characteristics of New England Road s
The railroads of New England In corp*rlPon
with the road*- of other sections of the" nation ^ave
relatively short hauls.The average haul of the New Haven
1b one hundred and twenty-nine mlles;that of the Bos-23
ton and Maine Is one hundred and twenty-sly miles.
Turning to the maior roads of the East we find that
the Penn has an average haul of' two hundred and eleven
miles; the New York Central has one hundred and ninety-
five miles.
This factor of having a profitable long
haul Instead of the short a^ml frelgh+ is one not
to be overlooked In allocating the New Ens-land roads
to any particular sy stem .Whet-ther the average haul
is to be increased or to remain stationary is one of
the criteria to determine their future allocation.
Int e rchange of New England Railroads
The New England roads, as a rule, receive two
and one-quarter cars for every one they deliver,altho
the value of each of the outgoing cars is superior to
the incoming carThe makeup of the freight on the in-
coming cars is raw materials , foodstuff s or coal.This
comoaratlve interchange can bert be shown by a table
Included in the Reoort of the Joint Committee to the
New England Governors.
(23). Report of the Joint Committee—May ,1931- -p. 23
t en
ocl, 5 1
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Ifttereh»n£% of N ,E,Railroad t with Outride Connect!am?
for ttoe year 1959
Road Received TDellTered Total
4-U.000 216,030 647,030
Delaware
and 224,578 92,553 ^17,131
Hud ffon
Pennsylvania 131,435 37,669 277,154
Can.National 99,041 56,119 155,160
Can.Pacific 72,099 64,247 136,346
Lehl*h*Hud8on 93,079 27,576 120,6-3
Central of N.J .62,590 35 ,996 93,536
Erie 70,450 21,053 .91503
N.Y.tOntario 51,541 16,776 63,317
Lehieh Valley 54,294 33,556 67,350
Lehlcrh&N.E. 37,019 441 37,460
Long Island 5,576 14,475 20,051
Other roads 1,335 2,017 3,352
(29).Report of the Joint Committee—May, 1^31— p.69
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Bridg e Line? to New Eng land
The Interchange of the New Fn^lsnd roads
with thr trunk line? la made, not only directly, as
the exchange of the New Haven with the Penn at the
Harlem River,but alpo by mean? of so-called "bridge
liner", a term which has become of importance in the
problem of allocation.
The roads which we shall refer to as bridge
lines arejthe Delaware and Hudson, the Lehigh and
Hud s on, and the Lehigh and New England .The New York,
Ontario and Hudson is, strictly sneaking, a bridge
line,but It Is more often included In the N«w Haven
system.Their importance in any disposition of the
Eastern areas is not to be Questioned after a refer-
ence to the preceding table.
The Delaware and Hudson
The Delaware and Hudson railroad is an in-
dependently owned corporation which interchanges freight
with the Eoston and Maine at Mechanicpvl lie ,New York.
The road also has connections with the Erie;the Lehigh
Valley; and the Lackawanna at Binghamoton,one hundred
and forty-eight miles from Mechani csville .Connect ion
is also made with the Penntthe Lehigh Valley;and the
Central of New Jersey at Wiives-Barre , two h/mdred and
sixteen miles from Mechsnicsville
.

The i^oortande of thil road to the Boston
and Mainecan be judged "by its conns ctions with the
roads Just outlined .Thi s road also originates tona
of anthracite coal In the Pennsylvania fields to he
transported to Mechani csvi lie , and the n Into New Eng-
land. Since it stands second to the New York Centr»l
in point of 1nterchancre , we can readily gusge its
further importance 0
The Lehigh and Hudson
The Lehigh and Hudson r« 1 lroad ,whl ch is
controlled "by theLehlgh Coal and Navigation Company,
a subsidiary of the Electric Bond and Share Company,
extends in a southerly direction from Maybrook,New
York, where it makes connection with th e New Haven.
At various points along its ninety-six miles ,thla
road also connects with the Central of New Jersey;
th Erietthe Penn ,and the La ckswanna .Although not as
important to the New Haven as the Delaware and Hudson
is to the Boston and Maine, the road can be considered
viattri.ly necessary to the New England system in the
future ,as it is in the present.
The Lehigh and New England
The Lehigh and New En<7l?nd , which is controlled
by the same corporation as the Lehich and Hudson, Is two
hundred and sixteen miles long^extends from Maybrook
to Allentown,Pennsy lvania ,iwcd from there to Tama.crua ,Penn-
nct*c3 9f^ beet ntdf to sbn*2ico'» t srfT
'4 r4 * ^ arm * to ^finno » 1 1 vcf b9HbUf 9rf nsosnfB" bnB
Ti m fttrrf rr a^J1 bns all ' vbo fflSffoaM bs^TOC^n?^^
tig ^fK sJ afjT
nctiosTfb ylieri^i/OB b nl sbns}x9
iw nof^99nnoc agjles srterfw, tfiox
+ rr^0 9^ + rfif'V ™.+ 09f!noo o^Ib 5boi
9T9bfsnoo ecf nso bso-r 9rfJ,9nl«M bn« hcJbo9 9ff^ '1
9rfi nf bi93"bvs bnsI'sflS w©H 9riJ" Y,T?s?!903n y-^ a*®* v
bflpl^ng w»M baa rfolri^ S<tT
tcoirfy;«M mcTi BbngJxe^snoI ealira naeixta brrs beibnuri
buvbibbT oJ1 9-i9rfcf noil frwii efnsvI^Bffns^.nwoJnallA oJ
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aylvnnla In the anthracite coal region? .Besides the
New Haven Connection at Maybrook , thl s road touches
the Central of New JBrsey;the Ne^ Yor> Central; the
the Reading and the Erie.The lrrportance of this road
la ouite negligible whencomrared to the two other
bridge lines.
Isolation of New EnglandNew
New England is bound in by the Hudson River
the Adirondack? , and the Berkshires ,as well as on the
north by a foreign country .Cut off from the rest of
the country by these barriers ,this section has t>rec-
tically remained aloof from the central commercial
area of the nati on. Waterway s have been the first love
of this section from the first, and so its railroads
have not received the nurturing aare accorded to the30
railroads in the other sections of the country.
Isolated as they are ,the New England roads
0
serve no imortant producing territory outside of this
locality .Yet New England finds herself dependent on
on outside territories for food and materials to keep
her shoDfl running .Prima rl ly a manufacturing district,
highly develoDed as such, and with its principal asset
in its sirilledlabor supply, New England must find a wa
to get around the natural barriers and carry in th*
e
coal and materials to keep her section in the fore-
front of the manufacturing industry.
(30).Haney—The Business of Pallwsy Transportation -
Part 2 f ch.6,r.9S.
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Manufactured products , then , furni eh an unusually larp-e
part of New England traffic .
For the United States as awhole,thia type
of railroad traffic amounts to seventeen ner cent of
the entire traffic ,but In New England manufactured
products as freight amount to twenty per cent of the
entire tra ffi c .Because of their hla-h value as freight,
this traffic of the manufactured goods is earnestly
sought after by the various competing roads at the
New England gateways.The general list 11 ?t e : hoot s
,
shoes ,paoer, leather articles , woolens , worsted s and
31
rubber goods.
The average revenue ner ton mile is greater
for the New England area than for any other corresponding
local section in the United States. For the average
sec + ion in the United States, this revenue is one" and
twenty-seven hundredths , whereas for the Hew England area
it amounts to one and eishty-five hundredths cents per
ton mile. Due to the short haul,characteristicof this
section, the operating exoen°e runs relatively high.
The expense of maintaining the terminals of
this section is also high In comparison with the re-
mainder of the country .All these factors must be con-
sidered in the allocation problem, and makes a thorough
study of the entire net-work incumbent uoon the leg-
(3l). Haney—The Business of Railway Transportation--
Part P,ch.6,p. 102-3.
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islsture of the several states as well »° the minds
of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The Gateways to New England
Mention has "been previously made of the
gsteways to New England, and It might he well to con-
sider them at this ooint in our discussion. Starting
st New Yor 1',where the ferries of the New England
Transporta tlon Company connect with the Penn,and the
Baltimore and Ohio, pursuing a northward course, we
arrive at the Hell Gate bridge
,
Jointly owned by the
New Haven and the Penn.Here most of the New Haven-
Penn Interchange is made, as well as some w^ th the
Baltimore and the Ohio, and t^e Central of New Jersey.
Maybrook,New York If the next gateway used
by the New Haven in our northward Journey .There we
have noticed that the Lehisrh and New England^nd
the Lehigh and! Hudson gained the ma lor share of the
business.The Boston and Albany connects with the rs-
rent corooration, the New York Central,
s
l
'.Test Albany,
Nev York. Then st Meetlanicsville ,the Boston and Maine
meets the Delaware and Hudson, as the leading bridge
line of all-
^hree other gateways of minor importance are
at Rotterdam, Junction, the scene of the Boston and Maine'
interchange wi"h thetlew York Central;Rc- se't Point, where
>stf awl ncI^nsM
til
the Vermont Central, the Boston and MMne.ano the Putland
,
connect \.ith the Canadian National and the Canadl*nPacl f lg
At White River Junction^ the Central Vermont also aakes
a connection with its parent corporation, the Grand Trttnk.
The comparative importance of these gateways
ie readily Judged by the table below, which is In terms
of loaded cars, and over a period of seven years.
*32
Total Car s Re eelved at the Gateway
a
Year Per
Gateway ending cent
June 30,1122 —June 1921 Increase
Harlem River - — 246,611 -— 311,945 26
Maybrook .—176,227 -•— - 262,944 —- 49 .2
Albany — 263,460 ~— 296,402 — 10 .4
Mechanicville <— -247,425 — 295,311 — H .6
Northern — 158.663 -— 225.421 42 s l
Total 1,097,391 -- 1,392,523 —
-
26 .9
Total Cars Received Delivered
---120,331 - 151,696 —— 26 ..0
Maybrook —
- 2)0,619 - 69,147 — 69 .9
Albany — 102,993 147,616 — A3 .4
Mechanicvi lie — 39,167 126,610 --—42. 0
Northern — 90.102 153.359 —— 7Q .2
Total -- 443,347 — 6^3,503 -- 46 .3
^32) .TteeRfcpci t of the Joint Committee
—
May
,
1931—
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New Eng land roads compared ap to Int e rchsnp g
^
The Importance of the New Havenin this
Interchange 1? gained by combininc the volume at
Maybrook with that at Harlem River,both New Kaven
interchange point? exclusively .The clear advantage
that road has over all other road? la thus strik-
ingly shown when compared to any other gateway
interghange .The total annual Interchange of the
NewHaven As well as carriage is approximately thirty
million tons.
The Boston and Maine is second only to
the New Haven, for this road carries annually 3bout
twenty-three million tons . Following the Boston and
Maine ^n point of carriage is the Boston and Albany.
This New York Central Subsidiary carries abo^tnine
and one-half million tonsjt^en comes the Maine Central
withits loeel interchange amount ^n? to seven and one-
hslf million tons. The Central .Vermont , with five mil-
lion tons is next in line, and finally of this grou^
is the Eangor and Aroostook , which carries onlytwo
and one-half millon tons annually.
Although freight traffic is the most sought
after traffic of the two, one cannot denv the importance
that passenger traffic has played in the building up
of the New England railroads .The decline of this im-
shijIov arfJ" "snln ttfrcoo bents? li 9'
;
portant source of revenue hap been mark of the
the past decade .Commutation businepp wAs the main
aervi ce
division of this pa ssenge/, and ,due no doubt to
the increased use of the automfcbl le
t
thi p phored t
the greatest decrea se .Over the period from 1920
to 1929, the total decline wap thirty per cent,
greater than in any other section of theUni ted
States. Over the same perl od , however , the freight
revenue rose ten per cent ,provlnc to be the means
to a maintenance of stability.
on 3vb t fens ,\p;»fi 93 neq slrii In notntvtb
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Financial 3 -rd i t Ion
Thr financial condition of the V.er England
roads h*s become since 1923 a pleassant feature of the
local transportation outlook.An unlooked for return
to earning power is Justly Indicated by the steady
Increase In net railway operating income, aided by
the reduction of operating expenses by a determined
management . In 1922 the net railway operating income
was only twenty-nine million dollars, and by 1929 it
had increased to fifty-nine million dollars,
The rate of return on the book value of in-
vestments in railway property Jumped from two and
eighty-seven per cent in 1922 to five and eighty
hundredths per cent in 1929 .Portrayal of this upward
trend aen better be illustrated by comparing the net
operating Income of the New Haven and the Boston and
Maine during the period from 1923 to 1930 by the follow-
*33
ing figures:
New Haven Boston*Maine
1923 |l,974,443—deficit |3 ,491 ,070-def i
c
1126 $8,852,075— g«in $6,573,404-galn
1929 $22,296 p 26S£galn — $5 ,993 ,34l-ga in
1930— - $15,363,791-gain $5 ,727,530-g* in
(33).The Report of the Joint Committee—May, 1931
—
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When compared to the Penn and New York
Central, the fatforeble position of the New England
system becomes more apparent, illustrated by the
gross revenue .The entire New Encrland system has
shown a greater upward swing thaneither of the two
trunk lines.
The rehabilitation of these t»-o partic-
ular New England roads has been referred to as "a
metamorphosis , an epic of the struggle of determined
managements backed by a few courageous stockholders
to overcome odds and win out." Since the New Haven
debacle of 1912 and 1913 , New Eeriglan* investors have
been wary of placing their money In New England roads
to the disadvantage of the investor as well as the rail-
road corporations.
Allowing these institutions to slip from
their grasp, the control of the New Haven and the Bos-
ton and Maine has gradually gone outside the confines
of New England .The Penn road, as one of the chief In-
vestors in these lines , according to W .W .Atterbury
,
President oil the Pennsylvania system, did so from
both a strategic point of view as well as from an in-
vestors 1 standpoint .Some warrant for such anexpression
is given by the recent declaration of a dividend by
the New Haven in November , 1929
.
(34) .Barron' s Weekly—
s
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ffte Essentials of a Transportation Pol icy
There have "been various essentials pointed
out as necessary in any proposed consolidation, and
it is advisable to consider these essentials before
entering into a discussion of the various proposed
systems
.
The two directors of the net-work of the coun-
try during the World War,Hines and McAdoo ,vaiBe strongly
in fpvor of consol idation.They felt that there was no
other solution to the problem fo the weak and strong
railroads* operating within the same territory .Both
men concurred in several fundamentals which wppe nec-
35
essary in any unification policy .They are as follows:
(l^.No solution could be made to railroad
problems because <Btf the numerous existing corporations
with their widely varying financial structures ,and
r
the suspicion of the general public towsde capital.
(2) .No plan could be permanently successful
which leaves railroad operations with a large number
of different railroad corporations ; some strong, some
weak
.
(3) . The plan should provide for government
participation in excess earnings.
(4) . Capital Invested in the railroads should
receive returns sufficient to attract additional capital
(35 ) .Consolidation of Ra 1 lroad s--W .M.l .Splawn-ch
. 1 ,p . 10-
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For New England the following ten essentials
have been regarded as necessary In any unification
policy adopted here:
(1) .The best possible service , constantly
progressive
.
(2) . The rate should be constantly as low
as possible,consistent with good service.
(3) . The management should not only be able
and progressive,but it shouldalso be suf ficientlylo-
cal to keepNew England development uppermost.
(4) , The credit must be good to enable the
roads to obtain money for Improvements at^a reason-
able rate.
(5) . Port development must be fostered to take
advantage of New England's nearness to the sea.
(6) „The present favorable Canadian differ-
entials must be maintained in the future
„
(7) . The gateways to New England must be main-
tained in order to ensure good service an1 a satisfactory
division of rates.
(8) .There must be full cooperation between
the traffic departments of the New England roads with
New England Industries,
( 9 ) .Competition must be maintained to insure
satisfactory service.
( 10) .Co-ordination of all transportation agencies
hould be effected.
(36) .The uepcrt of the Joint Committee—May
, 1931 -p. 101-2
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Advantages ot Consolidation
The crovernment has In the past spent hun-
dreds of millions of dollars In building highways
and deepening channels rwhile at the same time lm-
•37
posing stricter regi^ations on the ra ilroad s .Add to
those restrictions/the increased use of the air ways,
and t*~e substitution of electricity, transformed from
coal 8t the mines, and transferred to New England
through giant pipe-lines , and the need of some com-
•33
bination is apparent.
Consolida tionof freight lines, permitting a
solid train movement from the origin to the destination
,39
will bring benefits, if alliance is with a trunk line.
Simplification of accounting systemswlll be rendered
possible by a consolidation of two or more lines.
A
further advantage will be the heavier average loading
of freight cars , combining less car-loads to makea
full car .Eliminating many of the present duplicate
train ooerations and the combining of terminal facil-
ities would be other advantages resulting from any
trunk line consolidation with the New England lines.
Other benefits will spring from uniting with a far-
seeing management , but their Inclusion here is not nec-
essary to the solution of the New England problem.
(37) .Current History—February
, 1931; P.751
(33) .^orld' s Work—October ,1930;p. 26
(39) .Consolidation of Railroad!—W.M.W .Solawn- ch.7»p.232
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First Meeti ng of the New England Sovernors
Whenthe tentative system alignment was
outlined by the Commission, they called on the various
sections of the nation to give earnest thought to the
proposed groupings , and, at atlme to be appointed* the
Commission would visit each section and hear the re-
actions. For that purpose the New England governors
appointed a Joint committee to study the present ten-
tative line-ups, and report on their future effect In
the New England railroad policy.
This Committee Immediately went to work* and
after a survey of the entire situation , they invited
the presidents of all Railroads in the Ssatern ar ea
to meet the Committee In session and there £o give t v eir
views on the tentative alignments .The result of this
mreting was embodied in the Report of the Joint Comrr-
Ittee in 1923.
The dominant note of this report is that
none of the trunkllne managements wished the New Eng-
land roads to be dominated by any single railroad cor-
poration. If one corporation was to be in this area
then they ail would want a corresponding position
in that future .However, all roads favored the ocen gate-
ways to New England with each road sharing in the benefit
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Each president expressed his entire oymps-
thy with the development of the New England ports. In
line with this sentiment president 7*lllard of the Bal-
timore and Ohio stated that if the New England roads
became a part of any trunk line system, this section's
interests would be submerged In the interests of the
territory of the parent corporation, resulting in the
New England port development becoming a secondary
*40
matter,,
At a mgeting held at a later date 9 October
3-5 9 the concensus was that if the New Haven war to be
awarded to any road, then the New Haven would fare best
•41
with the Pennsylvania system.The only large road in
opposition to this plan, the Baltimore and Ohio
p
to
which the New Haven was allocated in the tentative plan
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, defended the free-
dom of entry to New England then In existence, and argued
for its maintenance in the future „The president .Daniel
Willard f refused to consider the New Haven as a part of
his system because <6f the precarious financial position
of the New England road, He felt that his company could
not further its own salvation by the added burden of
rehabilitating the New Haven
„
(40) .The Report of the Joint Committee—-October f 1923;p.l6?
(41) . " ' " " " P.2S1
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Joint Committee Report
The concluding remarks of this report ,and
termed the Committee's recommendation ,was that^if New
England roads wese to "be consolidated, It s interest*
would best be served under System 07 , the so-called
New England system. .This committee, referred to by
some as the Storrow Committee after its chairman,
used sound argumentsin its advocacy of Professor's
Ridley* s plan.lt was their opinion that the rail-
road management in New England must be sympathetic
to the development of New England seaports and in-
dustries.The policy must also be to preserve all
exlstting differential routes by rail and water to
8nd
the west and south/; Comparable rates into that ever-
*42
increasing market between the Hudson and Mississippi.
Trunk line control, they believed ,would not
only materially limit the free competition by way of
the then existing routes from New England gateways to
the west and south,but would be antagonistic to New
England industrial development 0 .The trunk line be-
cause of its obligations to industrftes t competitive to
to those In this area, would be unable to aid New Eng-
•43
lan^ to market its products west of the Hudson..
9 (42). The Report of the Joint Committee«-Octob«r,1923-p. 192-6
(43). ' " " " p. 132
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Bop ton and Maine contrary t o New Haven View s
The Boston and Maine F in Its defence of
the Trunk llnf control t said
,
"since consolidation ie
voluntar>/y ,no trunk line would fail to perve New Sng-land
land lines upon which they depended for traf 1'ic .Fur-
ther f such a plan would minimize the terminal fliffl-
are n
cultiesthey were now experiencig,The trunk line would
44
make possible a better and cheaoer fuel supply. "No
doubt» such a view was taken by the Boston and Maine
chief ly» because of its unfavorable financial position.
e
The New Haven officials wVe in- favor of a
New England regional system, and more particularly of
45
a Boston and Maine - New Haven alliance .They believed
th*4 the New England ^roads should be left alone to
to operate as terminal roads, and so maintain their
their bargaining oower with each road. If it was not
practical to include the Boston and Albany in the
regional plan, the n the next best plan voul* be to
use that line as a dividing line between the north
and south of the province with one road dominant in
each half.
(44) .W.M.W.Spiawn—
-The Consolidation of RallPoads-ch.5
,
p. 170-1
(45i
-
" "
"~ch.5,p.l6l.
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Committee Arguments against Trunk Line Control
The Committee "brought out other arguments
In Its fight against tru nk line control. A recapitu-
46
latlon of these Is as follows:
Include the Boston and I«*alne,the
Maine Central, and the Bangor and Aroostook In the
New Yorv Central system would add too heavily to the
present size and preponderance of that system In the
Eeatern territory.
( 2 ) . Competition would be cut down at the
gateway s .The New York Central already had two gateways
under tis control; one at Mechanlcvllle ,and one at Rotte
dam Junctlon.lt would also make two competing lines
in Massachusetts instead of three.
(3) oIt would be contrary to the Commission
ruling that the present channels of traffic should
not be Interfered with,The present interchange of the
Boston and Maine and the Delaware and Hudson would be
seriously impaired, if not entirely eliminated , by this
grouoing
.
(46) .W.M.7.r .Splawn—The Consolidation of Railroads— ch.
2
p„'<7-3
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Opno sed_ to the New Haven-Baltimore a nd Chlo Alliance
In Its opposition to all?:irent o± the: New
Haven with the Baltimore tnd Ohlo.lt was '-o^nted out
that over the lines of that trunk line va a the
longest route to Chicago ,the railroad center of the
#47
nation, Again, the Baltimore and Ohio «8? primarily In-
terested In the development of the home port of Paltl^ors,
and the New England Porte would, as a result , suffer
.
A third argument against such a consolidate or.
was that L r.e Ealtlmore and Ohio was not finenciallv capable
to reestablish the weak New Haven on a soun3 baaie.
That trunk line w^? even then finding it moat difficult
to weather the financial storm.
The relation of the Baltimore and Ohio to
the coal fields was the strongest argument used to defeat
this plan.The three coal fields from which New England
derives its fuel are located In West Virginia and western
Pennsylvania , from where the bituminous coal is sentjaar*
eastern Peni»-lvania t the location of theanthracite coal.
At the present time the 'bituminous coal
is sent "by wsy of the New York Central, and the Penn
lines .Shuttle trains from the fields of West Virginia
to Hampton Rhoads,then "by freighters to one of the
New England ports is the method used to bring that
(47) .W.M.W.Splawn—The Consolidation of Railroads--
ch.2,p.44-6
.

fuel froT these farthest fields.
The present lines of the Baltimore and Ohio
do not enter the anthracite fieldr,nor does any of
its suhsidlaries.lt doesn reach down into the bitum-
inous field? of West Virginia an* Pennsy lvsnis ,but
fc this roar! to New England from those fields would
u
consume many weeks in transit ,h e cause of the rond-
about way necessary to reach here..The cost Increase
in such a route would be an added reason to discourage
such an alignment.
The opposition to these proposed systems wa p
so forceful thfcfe the Commission <?ave up attempting to
coerce any railroad into the llneup a
Peri od of Prosperity Enters
The opposition to these systems was followed
by a few years In which consolidation was placed in
the background as each road received its share In the
unprecedented prosperity then sweeping the country.
The 8o-C8lled weak lines now entered upon a period of
upward financial returns which turned tbeir policies
from merger possibili tlee to reaping the full benefits
from the heavy flow of traffic over their l^nes.The la
ger lines with their far-seeing management s ^however,
wi»ere not thoroughly deluded.
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The Penn road was graduslly "buying Into
the New Haven p e well a? into the Boston and Maine,
both through Its own corporation and Its subsidiary,
the Pennroad Corporation which was formed principally
for the purpose of purchasing securities of trans-
portation agencies .Their strategy was well-founded
as succeeding years proved.
The years passed and nothing tangible was
accomplished in the way of system formation by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. W.W .Splavm, once of
the University of Texas and a recognized railroad
authority replaced W.Z, .Ripley as counsel for the Corn-
mi ssion, and he embarked on a personal study of the
entire situation, giving full recognition to the
arguments of the opposition to the tentative systems
of 1923 oo
New Proposals of the Commission
On December 21,1^29 the Interstate Commerce
Commission complied with Section 5 of the Transporta-
tion Act ,and furnished the ra ilroadswi th the results
of their labor, the railroads of the country formed into
definite systems. They also called attention to the weak-
ness of the act in that they were unable to force the
corporations to accede to their alignments.lt w?s agreed
that the plans fo 1923 were not sound in that t^e^ did
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not t*ke into account that the wesv roadr wppe finaci-
ally bo because of the war aftermath.Fundomenta 1 con-
ditions had since changed
,
future developments must
be according to deliberate fa shion,based on economic
and railroad expediency , rather than on obsolete the-
ories .Twenty-one systems were now proDosed under the
new plan, and in this publication New England received
first consideration,,
System #1:
The Boston and Maine
The Delaware and Hud eon
The Bangor and Aroostook
The Maine Central
The Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain
As we have already pointed out the DElaware
and Hudson is independently 07<ned,and runs from Bing-
hampton,New York, and Wllkesbarre , Pennsylvania, to Troy,
Albany and Schenectady , continuing north to Rojs&css
Point, where a connection is made with a sutelliary to
"iont real. The road makes a connection with the Fitch-
burg division of the Boston and Maine at Mechani csville
.
The inclusion of the Ogdensburg road jives a continuous
run from Boston to the Great Lakes by means of its
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connection with the Boston and Maine at Bellows Falls,
Vermont
.
Numberless argumrnts were brought forth to
show, the comparative values of this a llgnmentFrom the
financial viewpoint it was pointed out that there
. . is
would result greater financial strength Tl^an^at present
enjoyed a4- by anyone of the individual road? of New
England. The Delaware and Hudson had shown over the pre-
ceding years a substantial earning cower as compared
to the New England roads.
Furthfr,the addlt* ^n of the Delaware and Hud-
son bring? the local area nearer to the coal field? of
Pennsylvania's well as to the stee ldi stricts of that
state. From these two districts New England receives
these necessities for her mills and factories .The ad-
dition of this bridge line to a nortion of the New
England system had undoubted advantages , and would be
of untold benefit to this section.
The addition of tfce UgdensDurg to thlc sec-
tion would provide a direct line tothe We?t,and at the
opening of the Welland Canal in 1332 , shioment of grain
to the port of Boston would be facilitated .Upon this
western district New England must base its ho^es for
enlarging the outgoing freight through t^p port of
Boston.
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System #2:
The New York,Nev Haven and Hertford
The New York , Ontario and Western
The Lehigh and Hudson
The Lehigh and Ne» England
The Commission included the above roads in
the second system for Ne w England .Of this group the
New York an" Ontario has been since 1904 virtually
under the ovaierrhip of the New Haven, which controls
a majority of its stock. This road connects with the
to
New Haven at Maybrook ,and continues north/Osweffo on
Lake Ontario, and south to Scranton and the coal fields
of Pennsylvania .The inclusion of this ro^d did not
extent
alte r the present line-up to a considerable /except
that it gave assent to the ownership of the road to
the New Haven, which practically owned it at that time.
The New^Haven was deemed by the Commission
to be now fully established f inancis lly , and in a pos-
ition to acquire subsidi arles o0ther considerations in
favor of the New Y'ork,0ntario alloca tlonwa s its prox-
imity to the Welland Canal;and its entry to the coal
fields, so maintslning competitlo n at the gateways for
both the Boston and Maine as well as the New Haven
ejatened- trilos^a ti.elda 0 President Pelley of the New Haven
ct
f
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estimated t^at "by the Inclusion of this road an annual
saving of approximate lyone-h*> If million dollars would
result "by the elimination of duplicate personnel and
detal Is
.
Inclusion of the Lehigh and Hudson and the Lehigh
and New England would further strengthen the bargaining
power o£ the New Haven at the gateway s ,because these
two bridge lines have a connection with all the im-
portant trunk lines at some point in its system. These
two also reach down to the coil fields of Pennsylvania,
and so guarantee strong competition for the Boston and
Maine as well as the New York Central in the trans por-
tation of this vital necessity to New England 1 s door.
.too srroB $& Peri tl ^civii 3n.°$"ior'
'
-
0 . I
62
flyfttt m Number Thre e la not worthy of mention
bfcause it merely continues a present lineup of the
Hew York Central with its leased l'ne„the Eoston and
Albany .The Commission clled attention to the large
capital expenditures made by the Mew York Central on
the Boston and Albany , showing its faith In the future
status of that road in the New England field. The ex-
cellent credit of thi? trunk line p regarded ac the
most sound line in the F.«£t financially , as well as the
improved passenger ai.i freight service developed by
the Boston and Albany since its lease contract with
the New York Central were factors regarded as promis-
ing for the future success of that alignment.
All systems proposed by Various committees
allocated the Albany road to the New York Central, so
it will not be of moment to discuss this grouping in
an argumentative fashion. The only discordant notewas
that sounded by President Atterbury of the Penn road,
who said that he would agree to an all-New England
system.and place his corporation's holdings in the
New England roads on the market, on condition that the
New YorK Central would dispose of its interest In the
Boston and Albrny.Thia the New York Central refused
ins J
-r+
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Joint Comm i 1 1 e e _ At ta ck s New Sypte ms
The New England Joint Railroad Commit' ee,
whore personnel had now undergone change in
attacked this newest of system alignments .placing
all its strength in a strength "behind a single com-
prehensivr New Enf;lan^ system©
Against System #1 the Committee stated
;
(l),this system would limit competition at the Hudson
River gateways 83 well as at the Northern gateways ty
aligning one competitor with the other ;( 2) , the proposed
plan would Jeopardize the heavy interchange of the Boston
and Maine and the New York Central at Rotterdam Junction,
where thirty per cent of the Boston and Maine'" inter-
change takes place .The extension of the Boeton and Maine
two hundred miles west of the Hudson "by the addition of
the Ogdenstourg road would diminish the Boston and Maine's
use of the Canadian differentials and routes ;( 3) ,by in-
cluding the Maine lines in the system would start a ten-
dency to drop the level of the Boston and Maine wages to
that of these Maine roads. In addition ,lt would also
meen the operation of the Maine excise tax on the Maine
roads now placed under "foreign" ownership.
(43). The Reoort of the Joint Committee--Msy
, 1^31--p. 117-12
f)HB 3£ll
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In opposition to System #2 . the Hew England
Committee caller attention to the heavy e-'oense whibh
would be incurred by the New Haven In acauirlng the
Lehigh and New England ,and the Lehigh and Hudson,
both Indirectly owned by the Electric Bond and Share
Company .The Corarrittee also .went on record as being
directly opposed to the division of the Eoston and M
and the New Haven,
Maine/termed by the Committee as complementary to one
another. To divide the two roads the Committee felt
would be a policy which would not aid this section
in taving its place in future industrial advancement.
The New Haven needs the Boston and Maine fully as much a
the Boston and Maine needs the New Haven was their
deduction,,
Trunk Lines In Eastern Area No t Disturbed
At the same time the Interstate Commerce
Commission maintained the present trunk line division
in the Eastern territory ; namely , the Erie,the Penn,the
Baltimore and Ohio, the Nickel Plate, and the New York
Central systems. The maintenance of these systems would
not only prevent one corporation from becoming too
large in railroad operations ,but it would also main-
tain the the present conditions of competition.
(49). The Report of the Joint Comrri t tee—May , 1931 ; p . 123-5
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Four Party_P1an_ Announeed.
At the snme time , strong opposition to the
maintenance of five trunk lines in this Eastern area
was announced by the leader? of four of these me .lor
lines. Each rsilroad corporation feels, that the Erie
Railroad is not rubetantial enough to remain ar an in-
dividual road,and the Eastern area ,as a. result,would
bp better served ,not by five major roads,but by four
lines. The Erie should be equitably di smembered ,and
sections of that road allocated to each of the other
four trunk lines.
This four patty plan has the sponsorship
of none other than Herbert Hoover, president of these
United States, who on December 30, 1^30, in meeting of
the representative? of the four lines, g«ve his assent
to the proposed plan. In a letter to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, dated January 2, 1931, the presidents
of the four members of this plan asked for the Commission
to such a move.
The plan Itself allo cated the existing bridge lines to
each of the four trunk lines , without any consideration
given to the claims of New England .The political leadei
s
of New Engl?nd ,with the exception of Rhode Island arose
to oppose any such allocation, andhs\fc vigorously condemned
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the proposal.believlng that the bridge lines should
remain freed from trunk line control, at least until
the New England situation had been satisfactorily
adjusted
.
On February o^ the current year.twp New England
Governor? ,3ly of Massachusetts and Winant of New
Hampshire, apoe^red before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and opposed this four system plan,o8yln?
particular attention to the allocation o-r the bridge
lines. They pointed out that in 1929 these lines had
been allocated to the New England systems by the Commlss-
ion„Ely also stated +-h%£ he presented with this state-
ment the concensus of the governors of Maine,New Hamp-
shire
,
Vermont
, and Connect i ~ut ,as well ^shis, orn asgovernor
of Massachusetts .These five states, he reiterated , were
united in opposition to the four system plan including
the bridge lines before the New Enccland P-roup system
received final authorization.
The four party rlan not only contemplates acqu-
isition of the bridge lines \& New England ,but It also
has as its ultimate goal allocatlncA of the New England
roads to the members of this Trunk Line plan. The system
of the future under this system would be as follows:
(50) .The United States Dally—Frtruary 18,1932— p.
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(1) .The New Havenunder 1 olnt control of the
Pennsylvania and Baltimore and Ohio.
(2) . The Boston and Albany under th* Ne^ York
Central, a s at present.
(3) . The Boston and Maine, and the Maine roads
under the Chesapeav? and 0h?o system.
(4) . The Central Vermont under Grand Trunk
control as at present.
It is understood that by the nature of this
plan, the Pennwould actually be in control of the New
Haven, but the Baltlmoreand Ohio would have certain
trackage rights over the New England line .The alloca-
tion of the Boston and Maine to the Chesapeake and
Ohio is something new in systems, for that trunk line
is a member of the powerful Van Sweringen Interests.
(reM ©aIJ" 1c loiJncs ni scf ^LImuSor biucwcrnsl 9ff.t.rrsfa
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Trunk Line Cont ro-iAd vantap-es
The allocation of the N< w Haven to the
Penn is a natural evoluti on, according to the pro-
ponents of this plan, for Penn' 8 Internet In the New
Haven goes back to 1904,when It ntde ita first pur-
chase of New Haven stonk to the amount of ten thousand
shares «In 1910 and 1911 these holdings were increased
to flfty-thrr.e thousand ,one hundred and twenty-five
shares „or three and four- tenths per cent of the common
stock. In 1927 new acquisitions were oi8de through the
development of the Pennroad Corporatl on, and these purcha
continued ,so that to-day 9 the Penn and her subsidiary
holding corooration combined own almost one-quarter
*^ 1
of the New Haven voting stock.
There are other considerations besides that
of stock control favoring this alignment ,The major
reason is that of the present interchange of traffic
between the Penn and the New Haven, This Interchange
places the Penn in the forefrontof New Haven's conr.ee-
toions to the South and West, and it is of advantage to
New England to foster that relationship.
(51). The Un!ted States Da 1 ly--?ebruary 11 , l~>?r--p . 1
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Tho gross revenue from this Interchange
in 1329 amounted to twenty-one and fivo- tenths of
the total freight earnings of the New Haven for that
year.This preponderance of traffic interchanged , the
enormous Joint investment in connecting railways in
New York, notably the Harlem Bridge Joint ownership,
as well as the large stock investment in the New
Haven f are powerful reasons for maintaining their
present relationship, and even making this alliance
more binding in the future to come.
The allocation of the Boston and Maine to
the Van Sweringensystem has advantages which suggest
themselves Immediately .This corporation has brought
itself to, the fore since the World War with a rush
that cannot be denied.Their holdings stretch from
California to the eastern shores ,and from the Great
Lakes to the G-ulf,
The vision of its management in acquiring thes
cc&3t«to~coast holdings augurs well for the relationship
of any New England road with this corporation, which
the future might bring .The fsct that this corporation
has no traditional port to foster is an undeniable
point in its favor F for this would bring the Middle and
Far West to New England port? on an equality basis
with the ports of New York and Philadelphia.
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The unioubt-'ed financial strength of the
Van Sweringen combine lends a favorable licrht to
the alignment of the Maine roedo as well as the Bos-
ton and Maine to the Chesapeake and Ohio .The youth and
vitality tfl its management augurs well for the future
success of this alignment over a long period of years.
The maintenance of competition between this
ay stew and the other trunk line roads overshadows any
contention that it will ^isrur>t the potential bargain-
ing power of the New England roads „The three lines; the
New York Central, the Penn,and the Van 3weringen road
will each be vying for valued traffic out of Boston
and bound for the West and South, as well as the return
traffic from those regions .The Four Party plan, there-
fore, c?nnot be disregarded in the systems of the future
in New England
o
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The Rho^e Island and the V a n Swe rln> ren flans
There are two other plan? which basically are
the same as this ffcur trunk line plan, namely the Rhode
Island plan, fostered by the Providence Chamber of
Commerce, and the Van Sweringcn plan.The Rhode Island
plan differs from the Fou r Party plan onlyin th* minor
phases,for it contemplatcss.ll the major points stressed
by the Trunk Line plan.The difference arirep in the allo-
cation of that portion of the Boston and liaine ,now
leased by the Central Vermont through the Canadian
Pacific , running north from White River Junction.By the
Trunk Line plan this section was to be integrated with
the Boston and Maine,but In the Rhode Island plan, it
Is allocated and Integrated with the Canadian Pacific.
The latter road is also to have Joint traffic rights
with the other trunk lines over the Boston and Maine to
permit the Canadian Pacific to reach Portland
,
3OFton,
and Providence ona parity basis.The main line of the
Boston and Maine would be allocated to the Chesapeake
and Ohio-IJlckel Plate road, a member of the Van Swer-
lngen system.
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The Van Swcrln.qen pla n also allocates the
New Haven to the Penn and the Baltimore , and the
Boston and Maine, the Bangor and Aroostook, the Maine
Central, and the Rutland to the Van Sweringens , "he
Central Vermont and the Boston and Albany would
remain a? they are under the Canadian Pacific, and
the New York Central respectively „Another plan, not
to be considered here, because it has no particular
strength financially or physically ,is that plan to
combine the Boston and Maine with the New Haven.
Connecticut Interests have urged such a
merger,but it has few proponents outside that state,
as well as few within the state.There are other plans
as numerous a? there are local chambers of comnJpCce,
but the two chief plans for allocation of the New Eng-
land roads recognized by the Interstate Commerce Commiss-
ion are the Four Party olan and the New England Regional
system plan, to be reviewed later.
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H'ergerg Other Than Complet e Consol lda
t
Ions
The- Transportation Act of 1920, In its section
on railroad consollda tion p allowed an alternative to
direct consolidation bj a claiiee which permitted mer-
ger by stock- holdings or lease „The primary method of
consolidation urged bv the Act wa p direct and complete
merger ,but this method of complete control by stock ma-
jority purchase ,or in any other manner not involving
absolute ownership, wa s permitted
„
This alternative has now been found to allow
for contingencies which the Commispion did not foresee,, f
for it defeats the ends of the Act in allowing e*sy uni-
fication without the difficulties of direct merger. The
various roads have been quick to seize advantage of this
method of so getting around the resrictlons of the
Sherman and Clayton anti-trust Acts.The result has been
the* formation of holding companies to better facilitate
these plans.
So powerful have become these mergers and holding
Corporations that then real intent has been brought t finally
to the attention of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
whichpunfortunately , is porerless to act for it has no
control over holding companies.
These holding companies are now the object of
a bill placed before the House of Representatives,
(H 6R.9055) ,to amend the Interstate Commerce Act to so
empower the Interstate Commerce Commission to require

Individuals or coinpan^es acnuirincr railway stork
In auch a way as to Interfere with the unification
plans to divest themselves of that stock. It also con-
templates placing in the control of the Commission
those holding companies having the stock of two or
more railways.
This method of "blocking the unification
plans of the Commission can best be seen by noting the
Penn' a acquisition of stock In the Lehigh Valley road
through Its subsidiaries ,as well as through the
Pennrosd Corporation.This company now controls fifty
and seven-tenths per cent of the entire Lehisrh Valley
stock in spite of the fact that the road is allocated
to a system other than the Penn in the Consolidation
Plan of the Commission.
As we have we already noted, this method of
acquiring railroad property received its lrrpetus from
the wording of the Act itself. It now becomesa difficult
matter to demand that these corporations so divest them-
selves of such stock, and the result will be long liti-
gation. The conclusions of such court proceedings cannot
be accurately foretold , suffice it to say that they will
not readily acquiesce.
The Unit- c States Dally—February l8,1932-*p.l,6.
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Def ln l te Considerations of the Four P arty glSB
The four party plan,as noted, has received
sympathy chiefly beacuse It 5a In harmony with the
present relationships of the roads concerned „Thi
s
trunk line plan has its chief proponents in New EnpJA*^
located In Rhode Island, where the entire state Is tho-
roughly aroused as^Ylf In a crusade .Massachusetts savings
banks have also aligned themselves on the side of this
plan, fearing the reaction if the Penn and other corporations
are forced to throw their New England holdings on the
securities market„The group in favor of this plan
have been variously refeered to as the Annexationist?,
#53
and th«cpposi Lion as Self-Determinists
.
Although opposed to trunk-line control, Professor
^1t>1«v has noted that advantages will arise from such a
i *S4
ur.iforcation policy, chief among which are:(l) it would
bring relief to the New England carriers from ner'diem
debit balances which %&tl/dr?>w much of the railway profit,
(2) the trunk-line eoulpment would move Into New Ene-land
8« the property of a system owftfelng the New England rails,
resulting In more efficient operation in tran-loadlng and
movements, (3) It would result in a distribution of over-
head costs, and coal would then be brought in at cost.
(55 ) .Winthr ^p Daniels--Tte Harvard Business Review-October,
1931—p. 3-14
(54) .The Joint Report of the Committee—May ,1931,P.157-9.
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Governor Case of Rhode Island In testifying
before the Interstate Commerce Commission In February,
1932 said that such an allocation of the New Englnad roads
as required "by the Erunk line would redound to the future
advantage of New England, He believes that not only will
faster service be afforded, but Mew &r.glend shippers in the
future will receive the lowest possible rates locally and
to the interior of the United States by combining the
costs of the routing. He points out that it is essential
that there be no disparity between the rentes in New
England and the rates in the industrial te-ritryy to the
West,4f NewEngland is to regain her natural position in
the industrial future .This even-handed railway competition
by systems reaching the all-imoortsnt producing and con-
suming centers is urgently needed by this section.
Other advantages which Governor Car e points out a
are that The New England railroads will be placed on
the strongest possible financial baseband so affording
them the largest credit at the lowest possible interest
rates. His final argument was that the transportation
system will make New England attractive for the new and
growing types of industry which, more and more, in the future
will seek locations near the thriving seaports of the
North Atlantic.
(55).TiM United States Daily—-February 2-4 , 1932—pp . 1 ,6
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The tendency of modern Industry to bo seek the
Coast line Is "best emphasized by England's industries
shown a tendf n y. to leave
which have in the past decade/leffc the center of that
western and
country where the fuel is located for the^southern coast
lines. The construction of three important power stations
here in Hew England located within a few mllee of the
coast is another specific example of the recent trend.
Speaking before the Providence Chamber of Commerce
on February 11, 1932 Colonel Leonard P. Ay res, one of the
directors of the Cleveland Trust Company, and a former
New Englander recalled that in Ms. position as chief of
the Division of Statistics of the We r Industries Bosrd
and Priority Board , he w«s farced to transfer w?r contracts
awsy frora New England to other industrial centers because
of the indirect method of railroad routing found so necess-
•56
8ry in New England ^nd the entailed loss of time.
The middle west became the recipient of millions
in orders flue to this section's inadequate railroad facllitits
which today also predominates in New Englend . He pointed
out that the industrial competition for New England is that
with the manufacturing regions served by the railroad con-
solidations of the Four Party Plan, and th»t the best fail-
road plan for New England is the one which will prove4 most
helpful in enabling her to meet successfully that industrial
coraoetit ion.
(56). Colonel L.P.Ayres--Provldence Kagazine-Vol .43 ,No .2
pp. 43-4^.
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The future of Ne^ England pcrtg ia a question
brought up in consideration of all plans and haa been
used to oppose unification under the Four Party Plan.
According to General W. W. Atterbury, president of the
Penn Railroad, New England ports will receive the full
sympathy of the trunk lines under the Four Party Line
insofar as these trunk lines are able to aid the nr..
These per ts in the psst as part of terminal routes have
shown no improvement, and in fact hove dropped to s-jch
a degree that several of the leading steamship companies
have threatened that the port of Boston in the future may
be used as a "port of call" only. These Ner England Dorts
would under the Four Party plan, at least receive the
overflow tonnage from the port of New Y0rk, if not a
good share of that business now entering the port.
A proprietary interest of the trunk lines in
New England means that those roads would halee « financial
o
st»ke here and would then realize th€ lmprtance of over-
coming Nevr England isolation, and would find it profitable
a
to place New Eng^nd on the international highways of
They
commerce. *m& are not participating in the export of
manufactured products, and so the New England financial
leaders have no stake in world traie 3nd commerce. Only
u
by alliance with one of the tr/hk lines and resulting
- r
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development of her ports si outlets from the Mississippi
Valley and the grain fields of the West by rreans of
one or more port route! can New England Improve those
ports
.
h
The e^ef port In Ne*r Er.crland is Boston, and
following that port In Importsnde is Providence. The
lrtter enp-ces hut little in foreign commerce
,
hut its
coastwise coal movement is heavy. There is some traffic*
in fuel oil from Mexico, which is its chief foreign
business. Portland is the thrrd port of any consequence
in New England, which receives the bulk of Its tonnage
for foreign exportation f^om Canada during the winter
months when grain exportation becomes heavy in volume.
New London is chiefly esed by the Central Vermont Rail-
way as the base of its steamshio line to New York.
In summary the arguments pointed out by the
proponents of the Trunk Line syster. w*U-«h mav he cited
ss follows :-
1. Improved financial position of each of the
Ner England roads makinsr them stronger for credit.
2. Future participation of New England in export
of manufactured goods and overflow tonnage.
3. Will capitalize greatest asset - its natural
ports as terminals of long hauls.
4. Elimination of isolation policy of New England
(57).Haney—The Business of Railway Transportation--
c* ,6,rp. 100-1.
.
H j IOC
>
BSl
5« Place a financial itak cf theee ro?os In
New England.
6. Distribution of overhead expenses In coal-
carriage
.
7. Relief of New Enp-lsnd carriers fro.u readies
debit ba lances .
8. Trunk line equipment would moved into New
England as the property of a system owning the New England
rails,re suiting in more efficient operation in train-lead-
ings and movement .
9. Lowest possible rotes for New England shippers
to West
10. Faster service.
11. A system attractive for new dndustries.
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Opposition to Four ffrty Plan
There has been violent opposition In New
England, chiefly centered In Massachusetts, towsr-Jr
this Four Party Plan, ?nd the spokesmen for the opoosltior
have been as a ruls \ b^lo officials or fehelr emissaries
and politicians. This opposition has taken shape In the
Reports of the Joint Committee tc the New EnglencGover-
nore, neweneper art1 cle? ,and personal appearances "before
the Interstate Commerce Commission. This opposition Is
evidently sincere in its motives and unlike other dfce-
tructionists they have offered a counter-plan to the
Four Party Plan which we have noted before as the New
England regional system of Professor Ripley.
Directly opposed to the Four Party Clan and
core specifically to a Penn- New Haven plan ,Professor
Ripley of Harvard believes - that it would be unwise tc
so add to the Penn hold Ings »because the Penn is now
too big end cumbersome to be managed scientifically ,and
the addition of the NeT Faven would only add to that
•S3
unwleldlneso . This addition would be furthermore un-
desirable because it would add to the congested transporta-
tion conditions about the city of New York. He feels that
the Penn would divert part of the freight flowing through
the port of Boston to the New York po»t adding a problem
(S3) .W.M.I .Splawn— Consolidation of Railroad :~ch. 2
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to that district. A final argument Jliscnunted li
1 s
part by recent developments/ that the Penn has rot
enough excels earning power to build up the weak New
Haven, Since that argument, the New Haven has come uo
from the tottering financial position It w»e in, tta
a po^r.t where It Is now oaylng * dividend of 6^ to the F
Penn.
Testifying before the Interstate Commerce
Commission on February 17, 1932 Nelson Lee Smith, Aesis-
•59
tant Professor of Eornomicsat Dartmouth College , said,
"any domination of any New England railroad by any
trunv line ccniection induces the competition at the
gateways with result inglnjury to New England interests."
He developed this pcint fcy remarking that at
praeent the fou* trunk lines compete at Ne.? England
boundaries , and if one trunk line should irminste X.ie chief
carriers of this region, there would be a marked detrimental
effect, depriving Ne* England of even competition, and
prejudicing any future determinations of the Commission.
The £oint Committee had previously pointed out
this danger of lessened competition at the gateways, and
destruction of the bargaining power fcf the New England
Railroad is forced into a consolidation with the trunk
lines. This one argument seems to re a vital one since
it has been reiterated by all ooronents to Vie Fcur
(59). The United States Daily--February 13,1932 PP. 1,6.
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Party Plan. It hap grown up In the posing years to
"be s real bugaboo to the final dlspoe^tion of trie
fly stems
.
A second argument previously noted is that
the Nf»w England ports wruli suffer from this absentee
ownership, in that for the benefit of the loncrer haul
/New England goods for expert will be sent t,o the New
York port or Philadelphia port of the trunk line owner.
F. H. Fay, civil engineer, and reprefentin? the City
of Boston at the Interstate Commerce Commission
meeting of February citeC figures to support this ~on~
*60
H In 1923" he said, "the port of Nov York
handled five times as much New England expert business
as the port of Boston, and that from 1922-1930 rail
shipments of ITew England materials to outside points
has Increased to about the extent of expert decrease.
This tendency to divert New England traffic^ from New
England ports is due in some measure to Peru. Railroad
domination of the New Haven Railroad in 1928 imports
through the port exceeded exports in tonnage approximately
seven times."
(60).The United States Daily—February 25 , J.932 ; p. 6 .
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W. W. McCoubrey for the New Encland Traffic
Legarue at the same hearing sfibBtanti a ted these figures
by also calling attention to the sharp drop in Eoston
increa ec
exports in the last decade and a comparative «se in
•61
exports from other porta. He explained such a difference
by the Penn holdings in the N ew Haven and its substan-
tial Interests in three large steamship companies with
headquarters at ports competitive to Boston. He felt that
if the Penn was given control of the New Haven - it would
ship heavily from New England to one of these ports and
so practically close the Bee ton port to foreign shipping.
Increased charges for goods moving Into and out
of New England is a thlr^ argument which seems to carry
weight in the pi °?ent discussion. J'ayor Curley of Bo? ton
*62
stated on February 7, 1932 that "all freight moving into o<
out of New England will undoubtedly have to pay not only
the eastern trunk line charges, but also a high additional
charge for rail or other transport within New England."
This argument is directly in contradicition to the a9sen-
tions of the proponents of theFour Party Plan ,who believe
that such economies will be effected by consolidation that
a drop in transportation charges will undoubtedly be felt
(61) .The United States Daily --^bruary 23 , 1932—-p. 1
.
(62) „The Boston -erald—February 1932—p. 2.
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The present holdings of the Penn in the
New Haven and in the Boston and Maine comes in for
cc:.«ure on the part of all Four Party opponents.
Governor Ely , before the I .C .C ..demanded that the Penn
free itself of New England railroad holdings t for It
has undue weight in the attempt to solve the New Eng-
land problem.The five New England governors feel that
none of the four trunk lines should be allowed to acquire
any stock in New England •£ i lroads, except with the
approval of the I.CoCThls stock control cf the Penn
is held by that road over Nev England as a threatin con-
solidation oroceedings ,was Ely's concluding remark.
Without doubt the present holding? of the
Penn and Pennroad Corporation in both the New Haven
and the Boston and Maine have overshadowed the plans of the
Commission inits finaltreatment of the New England
si tuax ion.As yet no decision has come from that body
on the Four Party plan outside of New England, and, no
doubt, will not publish its report before the close
of the current year. Since all consolidations are vol-
untary, a true meaning of the importance of the owner-
i s unknown
;
ship of the Penn in New Englan/5 ;/for authority to mergs
the New England roads must undoubtedly proceed from
the Penn Board of Directors 0
f
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The All-New England Regional System,
The all-New England regional system
,
fathered
"by VST.ZoRlpley In 1922, and given powerful backlnsr by the
Ne^' England governors, is the system suggested to best
serve the Interests of New England, according to thi o^i~
onents of the Four Party plan 0Eliminating tv Beeton
end Albany and the Central Vermont from consider? tion,
since they are controlled by the New York Central, and
the Grand Trunk, respectively ,thi s plan would combine
the New England roads under one ownership with head~
quarters at Boston.
The Penn would be asked topxace most of its
holdings ^except for approximately t ;-n per cent, on the
open marketj&nd so divest itself of cocpartttlve control
of the Boston and Maine and + he New Haven 0The "bridge
lines would be free of trunk line control, and so this
New England regional sy?tem woul-3 be able to barge in
with whatever trunk line make? themost advantagous
offer on freight shipments.
Specific advantages would ariea from such
a system,not to be denied by its opponents .Chief of
these assertions is ghat better coordination in the use
of present facilities, a more direct routing of traffic,
so saving time at the .luncti^r pnlati within New Eng-
land would be the immediate result?. A shipment in any
1- JlSi c
0
trW oe bo*.,
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pert of New England would mov? from its point of
origin to the boundaries without the delay of treiie-
ferring from one wsybill to another under the present
arrangement 0Thi b argument has its counterpart in the
*63
Trunk Line proposal,.-, id so is not new.
Closely allied to thif argument, and somewhat
dependent on It, is that from the joint ure of equipmeh 4 ,
terminal? ,and repejAr shoos, as well as personnel, certa in
operating economies would result, and show its effects.
in a reduction of rates to New England shippers .Improved
credit for each of the roads would result in that there
would be a larger basis for credit is a third argument
having some foundation.
The presence of a local management with major
e
interests in Nevr England, and no conflicting inte/rets
in industrial regions outside of New England would better
the industrial position of this section in comparison
to its present position.With a management foreign to
New England, h3r interests would be submerged in the larger
interests of that outside management.
As a fifth advantage, New England railroads
v. ould be in a strong trading position, able to maintain
the present competition at the grteways,and receive the
resulting benefits «Added to this ,as a final argument,
(63) .W.M.W.Splawn— Consolidation of Railroads
—
eh.3;pp.87-91-
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is that a New England regions 1 system would be able
to continue the present Canadian differentials .threat-
ened by a trunk line control 0When one considers that more
than eighteen per cent of New England experts and
Imports are carried by The Canadian line 8, and so re-
ceive the benefits of that rate system.Although the
trunk lines claim thai they also will retain the traffic
now passing over th at system, the Ne? England regional
proponents counter that the trunk lines will find It
to their own advantage to divert most of this traffic
over their own lines.
Opponents to this Plan
The necessity for diverting the Penn and the
Pennroad Corporation of their present holdings in the
New England systems loons, as we have previously noted,
as the chief obstacle to the success of this plan. whether
or not the Penn will sodivest itself is a moot auestlon.
In 1923 President Atterbury said that the Penn would do
so if the New York Central would return the Bc?ton and
Albany to a Regional system 0We 'nave seen that the New
York Central refused to do so.
(64). The Report of the Joint Committee--October , 1923;
p. 172.
c
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At present the "sine reads are exempt from
the operation of the excise law 1n that state,tut with
control shifted from Portland to Boeton the law will
go into effect and add to the operating expenses of
the new s;,8tem.Aleo the present low w*ges current in
the Maine system will have to "be stepped up to meet
the wages of the Other roads, adding snothei ^creased
expense to the new management.
A third argument in opposition is that instead
of developing the port of Boston the new system, a live
to financial advantages ,will ship ita goods to the port
of New York to take advantage of the longer haul.The
management will he forced to think of its stock holders,
and any opportunity to add to the revenue will not bf
neglected ,whether the ^hipping tonnage falls iff or not.
1
In return this regional system will only accentuate the
provincialism of New England f and without trunk line
interests will all the more lessen the tonnage comlne-
into New England, and passing. out of tts ports.
I#
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Summary
These two plane-.-the New England r t cM onal
system, and the Four Party pl°n—are the only plans
which the Interstate Commerce Commission have undrr
considers t ion .A faithful expose of their meaning had
advantages ,a s well as their respective disadvantages
h8S been attempted in this paper .What the future will
"bring towards the solution of the problem is something
that we do not wish to guess.
New England Is now atthe crossroads , determined
on choosing one of the two plans,but unable to safely
determine which of the two is the answer .Her industries
and her ports are the t^-o chief determln*nts--whether
her fuFtb.e*- industries will be further aided by trunk
line dominance, or by a regional system; whether her
porta will be rehabilitated by outside control or
local control.
The industries of New England have Ions been
subjected to the disadvantages accruing from a provin-
cial policy ,whicv> has no counterpart in current rail-
road hi story .Labor? ng under the delusion that freedom f
from trunk line controlmeant better rates from a use
of b*rg»lnlng powdr^hes^ New England roads h*ve been
deludlndg local shippers with that line of rrasonlner
't'S'nmvt.
m
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which has failed to stand up under c°reful scrutiny.
Instead of lower rates the sMpner has received rates
no lower than in co^oarable sections of 'he country.
Delays at the gateways and at the Doint of
origin on incoming commodities have shackled New Eng-
land industrlesto a backward oolicy, which places each
industry in 8 position subservient to the railroads,
and have placed them at a cross disadvantage in the
markets of the Inlands.
Dependent on foodstuffs ar.3 raw materials
from remote sections ,her industries have been compelled
practically to carry amounts of stock far beyond their
present need? to forestall any shortage which mightresul
fron train delay. The financial handicap of such a burden
has been altogether too evident in the resulting upward
trend of prices to meet such a handicap.
To get this cheap and speedy transports tion,
to her doors ^Tew England cannot look to her local man-
agement for her future, but rather to an outside control
wMch for the oast two decades has shown an ever-lncres
s
ing interest In her railroads .This Is a condition , not
a theory „Loea 1 Investors have slowly let New England
railroads from their g^aso.and a far-seein? "foreign"
management has reached in ,and tided over two of our
(65 ) .Barron 1 s National Weekly--Aprll 23 , : 930 ; p .3
.
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railroads In the chaotic period? of the past ten
ye*rs.The Pennroad has been ouick to seize th' s opoortjnity
and will be quick to. aid New ^ngland In any plan for
her Industrial future.
Coal, which is go nr cessary to the present
upkeep of New England Industries ,is now brought In at
a profit over two or three different lines.Un^er trunk
line control the fu 1 will be brought in at cost,ii
order to t°ke advantage of a market which i c- second to
n^ne of like *>rea.This coal can then be brought in not
at Irregular intervals ,glut + ing the market, a* one period
and leaving It stagnant at another, but by regular con-
signments
,
conducted by a scientific management.
There Is? a law in railroad hi story, as yet to
be disproved fwhich states that the cost of moving
freight tends to decline as the size of the railroad
system increases. In no better way can this be shown
*66
th*»n in the following char 4 :
Ajnount oX Tonnage Cost par one huridre^_ml le_s
Less than two billion ton miles- ^1.49 per ton
From twp to four " " " 1.1-16 "
From fatir to six ' "1.02 5
From six to eight " " " * ,95 "
From eight to ten | .87 "
(66).L.P.Ayr es~-Provldc nee Vazs zAne--Vol .4? ;Nc
.
2 ,p .47
.
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It 1 e interesting to note that the Penn road
and tne Van -werinsren roads are beyond the trn billion
ton miles system. Such figures refuse the oft-spoken ar-
gument that the allocation of the New England railroad?
under the Four Party plan will tend to raise freight r=tfs
The evident decline of shipment? through the
New England ports has been advanced as an argument in
favor of freeing the New England roads from outside con-
trol.This section, it Is claimed, has been wrung dry of
export Business to dive t it to the horre r?orts ~A New
T
:ork and Philadelphia.No more fallacious argument could
be brought to the a**ention of the ^ublic to Incite its
resentment to o tslde control.
True,New England ports have suffered in t v e past
insofar as tonnage is concerned ,hut to say that the reason
fo"r this is ihe desire of the man? nent to develop home
ports and interests is to becloud the issue. New England
Dorts will not be developed so lon°- as local interests are
so aarrow-minded , that they refuse to see advantages to
an alliance to a lire which directly serves the vast terri
tory of t he Inland from where much of the export tonnage
starts for this section. Just as long as this group per-
sists in creating OD^osi tionto such an a lliance , then lust
so londt will the New England ports diminish in 1 ^ort^nce
.
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Why a rMlro-d trunk line would wish to
brine snoods to New England boundsrl*-s .sn"1 there trsn r -
f«^r them to a local rsilroa-' for a local ~>ort ,resul t
-
lng In that road receiving a ner centsge of the
route's charges, is "beyond the realm? of reason. Of
much more advantage to that road un J er present condi-
tions, to continue t^at freltrht over itfl own line
direct to the shipping olatform,and receive the entire
charge? without making a division with a second rail-
road , not In Its system.
New England has no trun> line syst^mdepend^nt
upon her ^eaport s .The upbulldlne of the^e norts <3em?nds
a consolidation of railroads w u lch will be able to secure
for here f c lr share of exportbusln^ss , then necessitating
first class steamship servi ce .Without such a oowerful
system there will not develop in Nev; En?lrnd a ma lor
port sufficient in size and attractiveness to gain
this exoort business.
To capitalize this opportunity the po^t city
must be served by ^ne or r.ore ma .lor trunk lines, which
will be in reality port routes ."""he shortest outlet;
in point of time from the rich inlands to the porta
of Europe is over a trunk line to the oort of Boston
,and from there direct to Europe
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With steamship cor,p«inl- f trying to reduce
the runnlncrt Loi from America tcEurooe "by building lar-
ger and faster shins, this lessened distance from Boston
to European ports will be of resulting advantage .However,
to take full advantage of that geographical loc- 1 ion ,New
England must give up the idea of ai independent system
operating wholly in New England. By alignment with one of
the four major trunk lines, this section can become ont
of the fore.ncst commercial ,as well as industrial ,c^ nters
of the United States.
The problem of msintensr.ee of the Canadian
differentials can be satisfactorily worked out by Ner
England industrial leader s , Joined by The Grand Trunk man-
»gement,in collaboration with the Four Party leaders.If
88M »fa ctory result* ere not obta ined ,there lr recourse
to the Interstate Commerce Commission.At no time since
1920 has that body of men f riled to act with unselfish
interest , and to the eventual advantage of the public, be
it in eolvinz £ labor problem, or a rate question. We cs:
place full confidence in tneir efforta In settllngthe
Canadian differentiaie a
Opponents of the Four Party planstate that
if the trunk lines sain control of the TTew Engltud roads
the, presence of thi s" foreign" system in this sect' on woul~
be inimical to the welfare of New England .As outlined
- r
1
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previously , this statement has no sound b&sii.The proced-
ure which will be followed In New England doubtless ,Will
be that of maintaining lccil management insofar as possible
without disrupt* t v.t present nominal heads.
F«clng Hew England is an economic opportunity
which has ntvar been offered any aua of like size In
t^ese tJmitad States be fore. To neglect it would be a
calamity oi enormous proportions .No feasible excu?e c?n
longer at, lay the coming of the trunk l^ne plan to New
England. The greet fundamental Dcssibllitie? of improved
service f roore economical ooera tion , stablli ? r d credit,
the maintenance of private ownerehin by citizens and
thc!r lnsti tutlont
,
, and the ability to envelop to the
full the potent! alties^lnherent in railroad transportation
lie in that dirction of trunk line control, and that only.
To speed the day of this control should be the aim of
all who. are desirous that New England once again t?ke her
place in the forefront of the commercial areas of the
United States, which h*ve be^n ro.iong denied her.
rei
.Bbesfl Isnlrcen ^naBsicr j.': 1, * Seisin tt
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